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Sisson v. Shaw, 9 Ves. 285, and note 2 to 'eenwell v. Greenwell,
5 Id. 199 ; .Ex parte .Darlington,1 Ball & Beatty 240. The question may be in doubt in New Jersey and North Carolina. In all
the States, however, where the practice is free from doubt, the proof
of the necessity and propriety of the original expenditure at the
time it was made must be as satisfactory and complete as if in support of an application for future allowances. Equity will then
treat that as done which ought to have been done.
HAMPTON L. CARSON.
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BURFORD v. GRAND RAPIDS.
Legislative power, held by the legislature or by municipalities, is in its nature
governmental and discretionary, and, as a rule, a right of action as for a tort
will not arise from any exercise of discretion in regard to it.
But if the act done by the municipal corporation would be tortious if done by a
natural personi the corporation is liable to the same extent and for the same reasons
that the person would be.
The common council of Grand Rapids having full control of the streets, and having licensed a particular one for coasting,-a sport not necessarily a nuisance,--its
determination is an exercise of its discretionary authority, and whether correct or
not there is no appeal to court and jury provided for or that can be had. No action, therefore, will lie against the city by reason of an accident resulting from such
use of the street under municipal sanction.

CASE

made from Superior Court of Grand Rapids.

Fred. A. Maynard, for plaintiff and appellant.
J. I. Ransom, for defendant.
COOLEY, C. J.-In this case the defendant had judgment on demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration, and the plaintiff appeals. The
action is trespass on the case, and the grievance complained of is
that the defendant city, having by its charter full and complete
authority to keep the public streets therein in repair, to remove nuisances therefrom, to regulate amusements therein, and to prevent
any unlawful, improper and dangerous use thereof, did, in the atttmpted exercise of its powers, at a meeting of its common council,
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held December 11th 1882, designate and set aside Fountain street
as one of a number of public streets and highways in said city in
which the unlawful and dangerous sport and amusement of coasting, commonly called sliding down hill, could be engaged in
by all persons desiring to prticipate in the same; that on December 14th 1882, said street was covered with snow and ice, and a
large number of men and boys, in pursuance of the permission of
the defendant so given, did assemble on said Fountain street, and
did then and there engage and participate in the said sport or
amusement, and did so obstruct the said street by means thereof
as to hinder and prevent ordinary travel and passage over and upon
the same, and to cause a public nuisance; and a valuable horse of
the plaintiff, which he was then driving with due care on said street,
was run into by one of the vehicles then and there used in coasting,
and called a "bob," upon which were a number of men and boys,
and was seriously and permanently injured and disabled.
The sole question in this case is whether the declaration sets
forth any cause of action against the city for this injury. The
wrong attributed to the city is that, through its common council, it
gave permission for the use of Fountain street for the amusement
of coasting. This permission was given in assumed exercise of the
legislative power conferred upon the city to control the use of the
streets, and the action raises the question whether a municipal corporation can be liable as for a tort, for injurious consequences resulting from an exercise of its legislative authority. Legislative
power, whether held by the law-making authority of the state or by
municipal bodies, is, in its nature, governmental and discretionary,
and it is conceded by counsel for the plaintiff that, as a general
rule, a right of action as for a tort will not arise from any exercise
of discretion in respect to it. This general rule has been several
times acted upon in this state: Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344;
s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 80; Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 164; -Detroit
v. Beckman, 34 Id. 125; s. c. 22 Am. Rep. 507; Lansing v.
Toolan, 37 Mich. 152; Toolan v. Lansing, 38 Id. 315. It has
also been very generally applied elsewhere, under circumstances
almost innumerable in variety, as the following cases, among many
others, will show: Governor, &c., v. Meredith, 4 Term R. 796;
Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135; Transportation Co. v. Cicago, 99 U. S. 635; Wilson v. New York, 1 Denio 595; s. c. 43
Am. Dec. 719; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Aasterton ?.
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JI, int Vernon, 58 Id. 391 ; Smith v. J1abyor, J.c., 66 Id. 295;
s. c. 23 Am. Rep. 53; Creal v. Keokuk, 4 Greene (Ia.) 47 ; _lfelley
v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 83; O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Penn. St.
187; Pair v. Philadelphia,88 Id. 309; s. c. 32 Am. Rep. 455;
Vincennes v. Richards, 23 Ind. 381; Roll v. Indianalolis, 52 Id.
547; Lee v. 3llinneapolis, 22 Minn. 13; Alden v. M1inneapolis,
24 Id. 254; Lynch v. Mayor, &'e., 76 N. Y. 60; Dor2nan v,
Jacksonville, 13 Fla. 538; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 253; Simmons v.
Camden, 26 Ark. 276; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 620; Pellowes v. IV'ew
-Maven, 44 Conn. 240; s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 447; Cheever v. Shedd,
13 Blatelif. 258.
Some of these were cases in which it seemed very plain that the
local legislature had seriously misjudged the public interest in the
action it had taken; but the fact remained that the question of discretion had been submitted to its judgment, and not to that of any
other tribunal; and when it had acted the decision was of necessity final. Cases like Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656; Carr v.
Northern Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324; Lynch v. Mayor, 76 N. Y.
60 ; .Evansville v. Dellie, 84 Ind. 325; and Wakefield v. Newell,
12 R. I. 75 (s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 598), in which, in consequence
of the failure to provide sufficient sewerage for the streets, the adjoining proprietors were seriously damnified, illustrate the rule in
a very clear and strong light, as do also some of the cases in which
reasonable and prudent regulations for the public benefit dnd protection had been suspended temporarily, or in particular cases to
the detriment of individual citizens. Thus, a city was held not
liable for licensing the construction of a wooden building within
its fire limits, from the erection of which, as the plaintiff averred,
his own building took fire and was destroyed: Forsyth v. Atlanta,
45 Ga. 152; s. c. 12 Am. Rep. 576; see Wheeler v. Cincinnati,
19 Ohio St. 19 ; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 368 ; or for suspending an ordinance forbidding cattle being at large in the streets, in consequence
of which the plaintiff was gored by a vicious ox (Rivers v. Augusta, 65 Ga. 376; S. c. 38 Am. Rep. 787), or for suspending an
ordinance forbidding the use of fireworks within the city, the plaintiff's house having been burned by the explosion of fireworks during
the suspension (Hill v. Charlotte, 72 N. 0. 55; s. c. 21 Am. Rep.
451), or for arranging for a parade of the fire department by
stretching a rope across the street with which the plaintiff came into
collision (,S'imon v. Atlanta, 67 Ga. 618; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 739.)
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But, on the. other hand, if the act which is done by a municipal
corporation would be tortious if done by a natural person, the corporation is held liable for it to the same extent and for the same
reasons that the natural person would have been. The legal protections of property are the same against artificial persons as
against others, and the state itself, or any one of its municipalities,
has no more power to deprive the owner of his possessions than has
the private citizen. 'It has therefore been held that though a city
is not responsible because of any failure to provide proper sewerage, yet, if the effect of the construction of one of its public works
shall be to collect water and cast it upon the land of an individual
where it would not otherwise flow, the city is liable: Ashley v.
Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296; s. a. 24 Am. Rep. 552, and cases
cited; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio 159 ; Turner v. Dartmouth,
13 Allen 291; Wilson v. .ew Bedford, 108 Mass. 261 ; s. c. 11
Am. Rep. 352; Byrnes v. Cohoes, 67 N..Y. 204; Inman v. Tripp,
11 R. I. 520; s. c. 23 Am. Rep. 520; Thurston v. St. Joseph,
51 Mo. 510; s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 463 ; Gillison v. Charleston, 16
W. Va. 282; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 763; Templin v. Iowa City, 14
Ia. 59; -Ellisv. Iowa City, 29 Id. 229; Ross v. Clinton, 46 Id.
606 ; s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 169 ; Van Pelt v. Davenport,42 Ia. 308 ;
O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 333; s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 470;
Dixon v. Baker, 65 Ill. 518; s. o. 16 Am. Rep. 591; indianapolis v. Lawyer, 38 Ind. 348; Indianapolis v. Tate, 39 Id. 282;
Weis v. Madison, 75 Id. 241; s. c. 39 Am. Rep. 135. So, though
a city is not liable for a consequent diminution of the value of adjacent property resulting from the grading of a street (Pontiac v.
Carter, 32 Mich. 164), yet if, in the grading, earth is thrown upon
the lands of individuals, this is a trespass for which the city must
respond: Henderschott v. Ottumwa, 46 Ia. 658; s. c. 26 Am.
Rep. 182; see Stack v. East St. Louis, 85 Ill. 377; s. c. 28 Am.
Rep. 619. And a city has no more right to obstruct a watercourse
to the prejudice of riparian proprietors than has any individual:
Lawrence v. Fairhaven, 5 Gray 110.
In Idwa it has been held that if a city which, under its charter,
has no power to grant permission for the use of a steam-motor on
its streets, shall nevertheless assume to do so, and the motor is used,
and a horse is frightened thereby, the city will be liable in damages: Stanley v. Davenport,54 Ia. 463; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 216.
And in Wisconsin it is held that any dangerous and illegal use of

BURFORD v. GRAND RAIDS.

a city street under the license of its common council will be a
nuisance for the consequences of which the city must respond:
Little v. JlMadison, 42 Wis. 643 ; s. c. 24 Am. Rep. 435 ; and 49
Wis. 605. And it has been held by this court that it was no defence
to a suit against a village for a trespass committed by its marshal,
under the orders of its common council, that the council was acting
under a claim of right, upon a subject over which it had general
jurisdiction under the village charter: Sheldon v. Kalamazoo, 24
Mich. 383. The same doctrine is recognised in Buskirk v. Strickland, 47 Mich. 389.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that these cases should rule
the one at bar; that the common council, by the permission it
gave for the use of Fountain street for coasting, licensed a nuisance in a public highway, and that the city is responsible precisely as it would be if the nuisance had been caused under its
command and by its agents. Schultz v. Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 255;
s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 779, is supposed to support this view; as does
also, very strongly, Mlayor, i-c., v. Marriott,9 Md. 160. If it were
unquestionable that coasting upon a public highway was always a
nuisance, there would be much plausibility in this contention, and
perhaps it should be accepted as sound. But in Hutchinson v.
Concord, 41 Vt. 271, and again in .Faulkner v. Aurora, 85 Ind.
130, s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 1, it was taken for granted that coasting
upon a public way, when not expressly prohibited by law, might
be entirely innocent; and we do not see how the contrary could
well be held. It has been decided in several cases that a municipal corporation, charged by statute with the duty of keeping the
public ways in repair, cannot be held charged with the consequences
of coasting upon its roads, on the ground of this use of them
constituting a defect: Shepherd v.Chelsea, 4 Allen 113; Pierce
v. New Bedford, 129 Mass. 534; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 387;
H~utchinson v.Uoneord, 41 Vt. 271; Faulkner v. Aurora, 85 Ind.
130; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 1; Bay v. Manchester, 46 N. I. 59.
These cases are not questioned or criticised by counsel for the
plaintiff. But coasting does not necessarily interfere with the customary use of the street, and might be indulged in with no serious
inconvenience to any one, not only in many places in the country
towns, but even within the limits of incorporated cities andvillages.
le are accustomed to make our public ways four rods in width,
but it is not expected that the whole four rods will be occupied
VoL. XXX-.II.-64
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for travel, .and it is possible to make use of parts of the public
highways withbut encroaching at all upon the portions kept in repair and used for passage. It is also true, throughout the interior
and western states, if not in those bordering on the Atlantic, that
in laying out towns streets are dedicated to the public which there
may for many years be no occasion to improve for travel, and they
become for some time mere open: spaces for the sports and recreations of those who may see fit to make use of them. It could not
be seriously contended that for the municipal authorities to permit
coasting upon such a street would be to license a public nuisance.
On the contrary, as the sport itself is healthful and exhilarating, it
seems eminently proper, if the street is not put to other public use,
that this diversion be allowed, if not expressly sanctioned. The
sport itself is not entirely foreign to the purposes for which public ways are established; for the use of these ways for pleasure
riding is perfectly legitimate, and coasting is only pleasure riding
in a series of short trips repeated over the same road, not differing
essentially from the riding in sleighs, of which so much is seen on
some of the streets of northern cities, when suitable weather and
proper condition of roads invite to this enjoyment.
If coasting upon a public highway is not necessarily a nuisance,
it would seem plain that the public authorities having the care and
superintendence of highways, and whose duty it is to prevent nuisances or to abate them, must have some discretion to determine
when and where the sport should be allowed in the public roads,
and when and where forbidden. The common council of a city has
frequent occasion to exercise a like authority; the streets must of
necessity be used, even in the most compactly built parts of a city,
-perhaps most often there,-for many purposes besides travel and
business traffic, and it has never been supposed that licensing such
use would render the city liable on any common-law principle. In
some cases there maybe a statutory liability; but it is not claimed that
there is any statute in this state which will render the city liable
for the action of its legislature in licensing the use of a street for
coasting, or that this plaintiff has any remedy unless it is given by
the common law. The case presented, then, would seem to be this:
The common council, having full control of the streets, has licensed
-the use of a particular street in a particular way differing from the
ordinary use. In doing so it must be supposed to have determined
.that the use in that way will not interrupt or interfere with such
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customary use of it for passage or travel as the public may have
occasion for. The decision to this effect is made in the exercise of
its discretionary and governmental authority over a subject confided
by the state to its judgment, and is presumptively correct. IBut,
whether correct or not, no appeal from the judgment to court and
jury has been provided for, and therefore none can be had. An
indirect appeal by suit against the city to establish a liability
against it for an erroneous legislative determination is not only not
provided for, but it would be opposed to a principle as well settled
and as familiar as any in government.
It would not follow that parties acting under the permission
would not be liable. Any person making use of the public highways must use them with care, and must have due regard to the
rights of others. Those having occasion to use them for the customary purposes of travel and passage have the first right, and
their use must not be obstructed except under circumstances that
are quite exceptional, and that make out a clear excuse. Whether
there were such circumstances in this case we do not know, as we
have before us such facts only as are given in the declaration. We
agree with the circuit judge that no case is made out against the
city, and no further question is before us.
The judgment must be affirmed.
(The other justices concurred.)
Owing to the two-fold character of a
municipal corporation, the question of its
responsibility for injuries inflicted upon
individuals is not always an easy one to
decide. -There are two classes of cases
which, while in the main distinct, at times
approach each other very closely-for a
city while acting as a part of the government cannot suffer its judgment or discretion to be inquired into, yet in carrying out the results of its judgment,
whether the vv:ork done is attended with
profit to the corporation or not, it is held
liable fbr acts of commission and omission.
The municipal corporation of a city is
an artificial being created by the legislature of the State for the purpose of
executing and carrying out such proiects
as may be deemed essential or advan-

tageous to it as a corporate body, and
also for the purpose of exercising such
discretionary powers of government as
may be delegated to it by the sovereign
power of the State. In exercising or
performing acts for its corporate benefit,
it is liable like an individual for the
action of its agents or servants, but in
performing discretionary acts, for the
purpose of government, and for the
general public good without benefit to it
in its corporate capacity, it is not liable
for the acts of its appointees or officers :
Freenanv. City, 7 Weekly Notes Cases
45.
This is the key note of the difference,
but the difficulty has usually arisen from
a confusion of what are corporate, and
what are public duties.
The diqinction between townships,
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counties, school districts, &c., and incor-- entertained as to its liability for injuporated cities is one that, in many cases, ries received by persons from defects in
has had an important bearing upon the the particular object from which it dedecision of the courts, especially in New rives a revenue: Mersey Docks v. Gibbs,
England. For a careful consideration L. R., 1 H. L. C. 93, where the corporaof this distinction and its consequences,
tion of Liverpool built the docks, received
see Dillon on Municipal Corporations,
toll from them, and on that ground were
chap. 23, see. 961, 3d ed., and the cases held liable for injuries received by a vesof Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247;
sel from a mud bank negligently left in
Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Id. 344.
one of the docks : Lyme v. Henley, 2
The leading case in England is Rus- Cl. & Fin. 331; Coe v. Vise, 5 B. &
sell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667, S. 440 ; Scott v. Manchester, I H. & N.
which was an action brought against the 59, affirmed, 2 H. & N. 204; Mayor of
men dwelling in the county of Devon to New York v. Bailey, 2 Den. 433, (Crorecover satisfaction for an injury done to ton Danz case) ; Pittsburghv. Grier, 22
plaintiff's wagon, in consequence of a Penn. St. 54 ; where the city received
bridge being out of repair which ought tolls from a wharf: Philadelphiav. Colto have been repaired. A demurrer to lins, 68 Penn. St. 106 ; Kibeiev. Cityof
the action was sustained as it was said Pdladelphia,14 Weekly Notes Cases 393,
to be a public duty.
which was a case where the bursting of a
In the case of Governors, 4-c., of Cast gas-main,defectively constructed, injured
Plate Cb. v. Meredith et al., 4 T. R. plaintiff. The court rest the liability on
794, which was an action brought by the the duty of the city to repair: Hannon v.
owners of a lot blocked up by defend- St. Louis, 62 Mo. 313, and see a review
ants, who acted as paviors, under the of these cases in Hill v. Boston, supra.
authority of commissioners named in an
But the cases involving an error of
act of Parliament, for paving ground in discretion in carrying out, and in repairing
the parish of Christ Church, and where a city improvement are those which have
the commissioners made a new, but given rise to most extended discussion.
necessary grade, the act provided for
The laying out of a street is a public
compensation in cases where the proper- act for which in many States a statutory
ties adjoining might be injured. Two relief has been given to parties injured,
of the judges rested their decision to a but where the city councils have detergreat extent on the fact of a statutory mined on a change of grade, it has been
remedy being given, but it was also said held in the following cases, among others,
that if ho remedy had been given the that if the grading caused a consequenaction could not be maintained, as the tial damage not amounting to a trespass
act was discretionary. These two deci- on plaintiff's land, the city was not liable,
sions have been the ground of most of the as the act is within the discretion of the
later eases, both English and American. municipality: O'Connorv. Pittsburgh, 18
Not to give a mere list of cases, most of
Penn. St. 187; Carr v. Northern Liberwhich can be found in Dillon, chap. 23, ties, 35 Id. 324 ; Callender v. Marsh,
passim, it will be sufficient to mention the I Pick. 418; Creal v. Keokuk, 4 Green
more important ones, and review briefly (Iowa) 47 ;, Cheever v. Shedd, 13
the reasons given for the decisions cited Blatchf. 258; Lee v. Minneapolis, 22
on this point in the principal case.
Minn. 13; Dorman v. Jacksonville, 13
First, With regard to cases wherein a Fla. 538; Simmons v. Camden, 26 Ark.
municipal corporation acts undoubtedly 276; Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 164;
in its corporate capacity, receiving a Fellowes v. New Haven, 44 Conn. 240;
pecuniary profit for the work no doubt is Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135.
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There are several Ohio cases in which
this principle is doubted.
Thus in Goodloe v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio
500, it was held the city was liable
if the grade was maliciously cut down,
and in Smith v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio
514, if the cutting was illegal. While
in McCombs v. Akron, 15 Ohio 474,
and in 18 Ohio 229, the city was
nel liable if the means of access to the
lot was cut off; and in Street Railway v.
Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523, where the
grade was once fixed it was said the
owner of a lot had a right to assume the
discretion of the city had been exercisedl;
while in Cincinnati v. Penny, 21 Ohio
St. 496, it was said that where an owner
built according to the level then existing,
but the city changed the grade, there
could be no recovery.
In Akron v. Chamberlain, 34 Ohio St.
328, where the owner built on an unimproved street, and no ordinance had
fixed the grade, it was held the city was
not liable, but it was admitted that if the
grade had been fixed by ordinance, a
recovery might be had. See Louisville
v. Rolling Mill, 3 Bush (Ky.) 416.
Where, however, the change of grade
involves a trespass a different view has
generally been taken.
Thus in Meares v. Wilmington, 9 Ire.
73, where the change of grade caused
plaintiff's house to fall it was held he
could recover. So also in Hendershott
v. Ottumwa, 46 Iowa 65, where the
change threw earth on plaintiff's land.
To this class of cases may properly be
added those in which the change of
grade, or the construction of a sewer,
culvert, or bridge, directly caused the
surface water to flow on an adjoining
lot: Rochester Lead Work's v. Rochester,
3 N. Y. 463; IWeet v. Brockport, 16 N.
Y. 161, where Rochester Lead Works v.
Rochester, is said to have been decided
on the obvious principle that a municipal
corporation is no more exempt from liability in case it creates a nuisance, either
public or private, than an individual.

Bathurst v. Macpherson, L. R., 4 App.
Cases 256 ; Aurora v. Reed, 57 Il1. 30;
Gillison v. Charleston, 16 W. Va. 282;
lWeiss v. Mladison, 65 Ind. 241 ; Dixon
v. Baker, 65 I1. 518 ; Orange v. Field,
37 N. J. Eq. 600; Rhodes v. Cleveland,
10 Ohio 159 (cutting a ditch so as
to overflow an adjoining lot), Ashley v.
Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296; Boss v.
Clinton, 46 Iowa 606 ; Arevius v. Peoria,
41 Ill. 507 (raising one side of a street
so as to overflow the neighboring lot) :
Inmann v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 520, where
the doctrine that a city is not liable for
the consequences of an act it is legally
authorized to pet-form, is said to be misapplied when it is held to sanction an
invasion of private rights; citing Nevins
v. Peoria, supra.
In Johnson v. Parkersburg, 16 W. Va.
402, the right to recover was rested on
the provision of the constitution that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without compensation - Elgin v. Eaton, 83 Il. 535 ; Stack
v. St. Louis, 85 Id. 377 ; Sheldon v.
Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383, and Eaton
v. B., C. &-.1i. Railroad, 51 N. H.
505 ; Wilson v. New Bedford, 108 Mass.
261; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13
Wall. 166. These rest on the invasion
of private rights, although many of them
might have appeared to fall within the
line of cases which assert that for an
exercise of discretion no liability attaches. The want of responsibility for
the safety of public buildings has usually
been placed on that ground : Eastman v.
Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, where a town
hall fell, injuring a voter : Bill v. City of
Boston, supra, where a school building fell
and killed one of the pupils: Lane v.
Township of Woodbury, 58 Iowa 462, a
failure on the part of the township to
provide lightning rods for a school-house,
whereby a pupil was killed.
The line between an error of judgment
in devising a plan and a faulty construection of an improvement is occasionally
very narrow. Thus in Detroitv. Beckmnan,
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34 3Mich. 125, where Ehe allegation was
that defendant was liable for causing so
short a culvert to'be built, and leaving
so much of the ditch open and unprotected that defendant in driving necessarily upset, COOLEY, J., says the
fault found is with the legislative action
of the council, while in Hardy v. Brooklyn, 90 N. Y. 435, where the city failed
to complete a sewer, and at the point
where the work stopped placed a wooden
trough to carry off the contents, whereby
noxious gases were generated, the city
was held liable. So in City of ndianapolis v. Hoffer, 30 Ind. 238, the court
holds that the skill and care which is incumbent relate as well to the capacity of
the sewer as to the mere mechanical construction, and in City of Indianapolis v.
Lawyer, 38 Ind. 348, that as the city
had by its system of drainage collected
vast quantities of water, it was obliged
to see to it that a way of escape should
be provided.
In Thurston v. St. Josephs, 51 Mo.
510, CHrMrMA,
J., in delivering the
opinion of the court where the allegation
was that defendant built a new sewer to
connect with the old one, and so negligently constructed it that the water burst
out over the adjoining property, says :
"Whatever injures or destroys the easement an adjoining lotholder has in a
street is to that extent a damage to the
lot," and criticising the decisions which
are based on the case of Governors, 6-c.,
v. Meredith, 4 T. R. 794, adds that the
maxim salus popuzi suprema lex is not
applicable to matters of mere convenience. See Inler v. Springfield, 55 Mo.
119; City of Evansville v. Decker, 84
Ind. 325, where a large culvert was
removed and a smaller one substituted,
whereby rains, which had formerly
flowed off, were backed up, it was held
that a city was liable for negligence in
devising a plan for a sewer as well as for
negligence in carrying it out: "Cummins
v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 ; Dillon, sec.
1051; while in Northern Transportation

Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, it was

held that the city having been properly
authorized to construct a tunnel, and
having proceeded with due skill, were
not liable for consequential damages. So
too in Fair v. City of Philadelphia,88
Penn. St. 309, followed in Colhns v. City
of Philadelphia, 93 Id. 272 ; see also,
Dixon v. Metropolitan Board of Works,
L. R., 7 Q. B. Div. 418, where the
sewer overflowed in an unusual shower.
It was said there that a public body, acting in the discharge of a public duty, is
not liable to an action for an injury
occasioned by their acts where it is the
inevitable result of what Parliament has
authorized them to do. On this point
see Mills v. City of Brooklyn, 32 N. Y.
489, s. c. 5 Am. Law Reg., N. S. 33.
But there is another point which in
the principal case does not seem to have
engaged the full attention of the court,
although alluded to. A city having the
right to make streets, sewers, culverts
and bridges is bound to keep them in
repair: Vogel v. New York, 92 N. Y.
10 ; Mayor of . Y. v. Furze, 3 Hill (N.
Y.) 612 ; Conrad v. ithaca, 16 N. Y.
158 ; Johnston v. Charleston, 3 So. Car.
232 ; Willard v. Newburg, 22 Vt. 458 ;
County Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md.
468; Barnes v. District of.Co7umbia, I
Otto 540 ; City of Erie v. Schwingle, 22
Penn. St. 384; Allentown v. Kramer,
73 Penn. St. 406; Fritsch v. Allegheny,
91 Id. 226, contra; Detroit v. Blakely,
9 Am. L. R., N. S. 670; 21 Mich. 84.
In England too, see Bathurst v. 3facpherson, L. R., 4 App. Cases 256.
All of these cases involve more or less
the doctrine of respondeat superior, which
is applicable to municipalities as well as
to individuals when the agents or servants of the city are acting in the line
of their duty ; it is hardly necessary to
say that where the act of the agent is
ultra vires, his action will not involve his
principal ; flayer v. Boston, 19 Pick.
511.

A city is said not io be an insurer
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that a tree in a wagon left standing in a
street was not a material obstruction ;
see Sikes v. Manchester, 59 Iowa 65; or
that the accident happened from the unlawful act of a third party.
In Allegheny v. Zimmerman, 14 Penn.
St. 291, the majority of the court hold
department, or an outside contractor.
huntsit has been held not liable for that it should be left to a jury to say whefailure on the part of the fire department ther a liberty pole is a nuisance from its
to buy proper material: Wheeler v. Cin- location on the street, but usually it has
cinati, 19 Ohio St. 19 ; Black v. Co- been settled as a matter of law. The
luntbia, 19 So. Car. 412, or for the torts following have been held to be material
and misfeasance of police officers : Uartin obstructions which a city is bound to rev. Brooklyn, 1 Hill 545 ; 11artv. Bridge- move: a stick of timber, Springer v.
port, 13 Blatchf. 289 ; City v. Elliott, 75 Bowdoinham, 7 Me. 442; a rope across
Penn. St. 347; corticana v. White, 57 the street, Irench v. Brunswick, 21 Me.
Tex. 382; Attaway v. Cartersville, 68 29 ; contra, Barber v. Pwxbury, I1 Allen
Ga. 740 ; or for the torts of the fire de- 318 ; stones left in the road, Biqelow v.
partent: Jewett v. Nlew faven, 38
Weston, 3 Pick. 267 ; Farley v. City, 1I
Conn. 373; Ioward v. San Francisco, Weekly Notes Cases 136 ; a projecting
51 Cal. 52: O'Meara v. New York, 1 awning, Drake v. Lowell, 13 Met. 292;
Daly 425 ; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. contra, ones v. Boston, 104 Mass. 75
87 ; Hafford v. N'ew Bedford, 16 Gray drifts of snow, Providence v. Clapp, 17
297 ; Freeman v. City of Philadelphia,7 How. 161; McLaughlin Y. Corry, 77 Penn.
Wreekly Notes Cases 45 ; Id. 558 ; or for St. 109 ; Mauch Chunkv. Kline, 100 Id.
119 ; Collins v. Council Bluffs, 32 Iowa
the work of an independent contractor:
520; Luther v. Worcester, 97 Mass. 269;
Painterv. Pittsburgh, 46 Penn. St. 221
Griffin v. New York, 9 N. Y. 456; a
3 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 350, and note.
These cases rest on the public func- dead horse, F-itsch v. Allegheny, 91 Penn.
tions exercised by the various officers St. 226, in which case lMfrncv;, J.. says:
appointed by the city. But the question "A municipal corporation is bound to
in the principal case, although put by the keep the streets, roads and bridges in rejudge on the same ground, is not in pair. A road or street may be put out
principle as clearly settled by the deci- of repair by the deposit of obstructions
sions cited. While not denying in terms which impede and hinder travel, or make
the right of a city to repeal an ordinance it dangerous, or by partial destruction
which gives a traveller on the highway of the roadbed itself, producing like
that security which he has a right to de- effect. This is in direct opposition to Demanud from a municipality either as a troit v. Blakeby, supra, 9 Am. L. Reg. N.
duty imposed on it by the charter or as S. 670, where the court deny any reput in some cases as a duty which it as- sponsibility on the part of a city for
sumes in consideration of receiving a defects in its streets on the ground that
charter ( West v. Brocport, 16 W. Y. the duty or power of keeping them
161), the cases alluded to have usually in repair is a public one not a private
rested the city's freedom from liability on one, .but the current of authority as
one of two grounds. Either that the shown in the note to that case, and by
hindrance to travel was not a material later decisions is all in the other direcobstruction such as cities are bound to tion: Grove v. Kansas, 75 Mo. 672.
remove from their streets, as in Davis v. The ground that coasting is not a mateBangor, 42 Me. 522, where it was held rial obstruction which cities are bound on
against accidents on its sidewalks: Smith
v. City q1 Philaddphia, 81 Pcu. St.
38; Cain v. Syracuse, 29 Hun 105;
B3ardsky v. .artfbrd, 29 Alb. L. J.
342, and cases cited; nor is it liable
for the acts of those in an independent
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due notice, or after a lapse of time, to
have removed, is taken in Ray v. Manchester, 46 N. H. 59 ; ifutchinson v.
Concord, 41 Vt. 271 ; Pierce v. New
Bedford, 129 Mass. 534. These cases
rest on Davis v. Bangor, supra. In
Butchinson v. Concord, there was an
ordinance against coasting.
Undoubtedly many cases hold that a
nuisance which occurs from an unwise
exercise of discretion, as in Simon v.
Atlanta, 67 Ga. 618, where a rope was
stretched across the street for a fire parade : Smith v. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506;
or for omission to preserve the peace by
the proper custodians, as in Norristown
v. .Ytzpatrick, 94 Penn. St, 121 ; or for
suspending an ordinance forbidding cattle
to be at large; Levy v. Mayor, I Sandf.
45 ; Rivers v. Augusta, 65 Ga. 376; will
not render the city liable, and the second
ground on which cities have escaped responsibility is allied to this, namely,
that for the unlawful act of a third party
no recovery can be had against the municipality ; yet no case up to the present one
has asserted that a direct authorization
of such a use of its streets by the municipal corporation will not render it liable
for injuries directly resulting therefrom.
In Bathurst v. Macpherson, supra, which
was an action against a borough by
plaintiff, whose horse had fallen into a
drain which the borough had constructed,
but allowed to crumble away, BAns.as
PEACOCK, J., delivering the opinion of
the court, says: " The borough is liable because they caused a nuisance for
which, whatever their statutory liability
might be they were liable to an indictment at common law, and also to an
action."
In Shepperd v. Chelsea, 4 Allen 113,
where a party was injured by a boy
coasting, the muncipality was held. to be
relieved because the accident happened
from the unlawful act of a third party.
In Faulkner v. Aurora, 85 Ind. 130,
there being an ordinance, prohibiting all
sports tending to produce bodily injury

the court decided that no action lay
against the city, as such a use of the
street is not only unauthorized, but altogether inconsistent with the rights of the
public. This by a divided court. In
Schultz v. Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 255, a
demurrer to the complaint was sustained
because it was not stated therein that
councils did grant a license to persons to
coast on the streets ; while in Little v.
Madison, 42 Wis. 643, it was held that
allowing and licensing a bear show to be
held on the public streets was an obstruction, and that plaintiff's horse becoming frightened thereat the city was liable.
Nor does the court speak in any hesitating manner, Corm, J., saying: "It
seems to me the averments state an actionable injury. They show that the
agents of the city not only knowingly
and carelessly allowed one ofits principal
streets to become obstructed by an exhibition of wild animals, which exhibition
was calculated to produce injury to
persons lawfully travelling along the
streets, but it alleged that such exhibition was authorized and sanctioned by
the city. Now if such were the facts can
there be a doubt as to the liability of the
city for the injury both on the ground
that it fails to perform its legal duty
of keeping the streets free from all dangerous obstructions and nuisanee, and
on the other ground that the exhibition
was authorized We should certainly
hesitate to sanction the principle that
a municipal corporation might knowingly and unnecessarily sanction a
nuisance or dangerous obstruction to be
placed in one of its streets without being
answerable for damages occasioned
thereby. So in Marriott v. Baltimore,
supra, the court says it was not only
necessary that the city should pass ordinances, but it was bound to see that
these ordinances were enforced.
In Stanley v. Davenport, 54 Iowa 463,
the court rests their decision as to the liability of the city which allowed steam
motors, on the ground that a city has no
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inherent right so to do, and is responsible for personal injuries caused by its
wrongful act. N\or is the force of Little
v. Madison broken by the later cases of
Little v. Madlson, 49 Wis. 605, and
role v. NYwlcuryport, 129 Mass. 594 ;
for in both of these cases the allegation
and proof were that the accident happened while the animals were traversing the streets, anl not in the places
where the city had authorized them to he
exhibited. In the former the decision
was rested on its being a ease where tie
police officers neglected to prevent the

owners of the beasts making an improper use of the streets.

The principal case is then an importaut one, as resting the decision of what
is or is not a nuisance in the minds of
the town council rather than in the
court or jury, while at the same time
it decides that coasting not being a
nuisance per se, "the municipal authorities must have a discretion when
and where tile sport should be allowed,
and when and where forbidden."
WILLIAM DRATON.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
QUINN v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. RAILROAD CO.
One whose foundation walls are injured by water percolating through the soil
from an adjoining lot has a cause of action against the owner thereof if the
water was unlawfully or unreasonably allowed to remain standing thereon, and not
otherwise.
Damages to the owner or occupant of land by reas-on of a diminution of the value
thereof caused by a neighboring nuisance must be confined to the time during which
the nuisance existed.

APPEAL from Polk Circuit Court.
Action for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of
a nuisance caused by an excavation in the earth, and by water collecting and standing therein. A verdict and judgment were
rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
Parsons& Runnells, for appellant.

Henry S. Wilcox, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ADAMNS, J.-The plaintiff owns and resides upon a certain lot in
the city of Des Moines. The defendant owns a lot adjoining. In
the construction of its road earth was taken from its lot and a
large excavation made. Water collected and stood therein, and,
according to the evidence, rendered the plaintiff's premises less
desirable as a residence, and caused some permanent damage
VOL. XXXI.-65
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to the plaintiff's cellar walls, and to the foundation of her
house.

The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury in these
words: "You are instructed that no damages can be recovered by
the plaintiff, except such as resulted from the fact that the excavation made by the defendant upon its lot was, at the time of such
damage, a public nuisance ; and any damage caused to the property of the plaintiff by the mere fact that the excavation contained water which undermined the plaintiff's house, should not be
considered by you in estimating the damages which she is entitled
to recover." The court refused to so instruct, and the refusal is
assigned as error.
, The instruction is not entirely clear ; but as we understand it,
it would, if given, have excluded all damages sustained from the
undermining of the house. The evidence shows that such damages,
if any, resulted from water percolating through the soil. The rule
is well settled that no action can be maintained for the diversion
of percolating water, where the act of diversion is done by the
owner of the premises where done, and is done in good faith. But
the injury complained of in this case did not arise from the diversion of percolating water from where it was wanted, as from a well
or spring, but from so collecting water that it reached, by percolation, to where it was not wanted, to wit, to a cellar and to the
foundation walls of a house.
Our attention has been called to no case where the precise question
presented has been decided. On principle it would seem that the
plaintiff ought not to recover for such damage if it resulted from the
lawful and reasonable use by the defendant of its own lot. How far
the plaintiff's house was from the line between her lot and the defendant's does not appear; but the evidence shows that it was near.
It shows that it was only four feet between the house and the excavation. If the distance between the house and the line was not such
as to afford immunity against water percolating from the defendant's
lot, it was the fault of the person who built the house, unless
the water was collected and suffered to stand on the defendant's lot
through some unlawful or unreasonable use or sufferance. Such use
or sufferance the owner of the injured premises was not, we think
bound to anticipate, and consequently was not bound to provide
against. It is true that there was no necessary connection between
the condition of the water which made it a nuisance, if it was such,

QUINN v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. RAILROAD CO.

515

and the injury sustained from the undermining of the house; yet
it cannot be denied that the length of time during which the water
was allowed to stand, was among other things the cause of both.
It is to be observed, also, that during the continuance of the
nuisance the defendant was without excuse in suffering the water to
remain. The defendant was under constant obligation to remove it
and the plaintiff had reason to suppose that it would remove it.
During that time it was not for the defendant to say that the injury
being sustained by the plaintiff was not actionable, because merely
incidental to the exercise by the defendant of its own rights.
While we think that the instruction asked went too far, and was
properly refused, the court should, we think, have submitted the
question as to whether the defendant became guilty of a nuisance,
as alleged in the petition, and should have instructed the jury that
in case they so found they might allow the plaintiff for such injury
as her premises sustained from the percolation of water from the
excavation after the same became and while it remained a nuisance.
The court allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence to the
effect that she and her family suffered great discomfort from the
offensive condition of the water collected on the defendant's lot,
and that the rental value of the premises was reduced from nine
dollars a month to nothing. The court gave an instruction in these
words; "Your inquiry will be from March 27th 1880, to June
13th 1882." As to what the court meant we are somewhat uncertain. As to the date of March 27th 1880, we have to say that we
see nothing in the evidence respecting it. Besides, it is shown
affirmatively that the plaintiff moved upon the premises after that
date, to wit, in April of that year; and, what is more, the evidence
shows that no trouble was experienced flrom the water until several
months later. It is true, the plaintiff took an assignment from her
grantor of his claim for damages, but the evidence fails to show that
he sustained any. The plaintiff's right of recovery for diminution
in the value of the use of the premises should have been limited to
the time during which it was proven that the nuisance existed. In
the instruction given it appears to us that the court erred.
Reversed.
We have been unable to find any
case where the precise question involved
in the principal case has been decided.
Upon principle, however, it seems clear

that it is but a new application of the
familiar maxim: Sic ttere tao, ut alieynun
non lcedas: Broom's Legal Maxims
*357.
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As a general proposition "a landowner may [it is said] change the grade
of its surface, and; if in. the absence of
grant, prescription or mutual stipulation,
mere surface water or the natural drainage is displaced, obstructed or caused
to accumulate upon the adjoining land,
or upon a street or highway, no right
of action arises :" Gould on Waters,
267, citing Lutherv. Winnisimmet Co.,
9 Cush. 171 ; Morrill v. Hurley, 120
Mass. 99; Parks v. Newburyport, 10
Gray 28; Plagg v. Worcester, 13 Id.
601 ; Dickinson v. Worcester, 7 Allen 19;
Bangor v. Lansil, 51 Me. 521 ; Goodale
v. Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 459.
" According to the rule established in
Massachusetts and New Jersey, an owner
of land may erect structures upon it of
any size, height or depth, irrespective
of their effect upon mere surface water
or the natural drainage:" Gould on
Waters,
268; Parks v. Newburyport,
10 Gray 28 ; Bates v. Smith, 100 Mass.
181 ; Bowlsby v. Speer, 2 Vroom 351;
Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen 106.
The rule above stated has not, however, been approved in all of the states.
See, generally, Gould on Waters, J 267,
268, and cases cited; Bentz v. Armstrong,
8 W. & S. 40 ; Cin., H. 4- D. Railroad
Co. v. Ahr, 2 Cin. 504; Whitney v. Sanders, 3 Pitts. 226 ; Freudenstein v. Heine,
6 Mo. App. 287; Mellor v. Pilgrim, 3
Brad. (Ill.) 476; 7 Id. 306; Hicks v.
Silliman, 93 Ill. 255.
The case of Eurdman v. N. B. Railway Co., L. R., 3 C. P. D. 168, is an
instructive case as touching the question
involved in the principal case. In that
case a statement of claim alleging that
the surface of the defendant's land had
been artificially raised by large quantities of soil, clay, limestone and other
refuse placed thereon close to and adjoining the plaintiff's house, thereby raising
the surface of defendant's land above
the level of the land upon which the
plaintiff's house was built, and that in
consequence of such negligence the rain

water falling on defendant's land made
its way through the defendant's wall
into the adjoining house of the plaintiff
and caused substantial damage, was held
upon demurrer to disclose a good cause
of action.
The judgment of the court was delivered by COTTox, L. J., who among
other things said: " The heap or mound
on the defendant's land must, in our
opinion, be considered an artificial work.
Every occupier of land is entitled to the
reasonable enjoyment thereof. This is
a natural right of property, and it is
well established that an occupier of land
may protect himself by action against
any one who allows any filth or any
other noxious thing produced by him on
his own land to interfere with this enjoyment.
We are further of opinion
that, subject to a qualification to be hereafter mentioned, if any one, by artificial
erection on his own land, causes water,
even though arising from natural rainfall only, to pass into his neighbor's
land, and thus substantially to interfere
with his enjoyment, he will be liable to
an action at the suit of him who is so
injured, and this view agrees with the
opinion expressed by the Master of the
Rolls in the case of Broder v. Saillard,
L. R., 2 Ch. D. 700.
I have limited
this statement of liability to liability for
allowing things in themselves offensive
to pass into a neighbor's property, and
for causing by artificial means things in
themselves inoffensive to pass into a
neighbor's property to the prejudice of
his enjoyment thereof, because there are
many things which when done on a
man's own land (as building so as to
interfere with the prospect or so as to obstruct lights not abcient) are not actionable, even though they interfere with a
neighbor's enjoymentofhisproperty. * * *
The owner of land holds his right to the
enjoyment thereof, subject to such annoyance as is the consequence of what is called
the natural user by his neighbor of his
land, and when an interference with this
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enjoyment by something in the nature
of at nuisance (as distinguished fniom an
interruption or distnrbance of an easement or right of property in ancient
lights, or the support for the surface to
which every owner of property is entitied) is the cause of complaint, no action
can be maintained if this is tile result
of the natural user by a neighbor of his
land."

In l'ilson v. a'itddell, L. R., 2 App.
Cas. 99, the seam of coal of the defendant cropped out at the surface and entered the plaintiff's holding at a depth
of many fathoms below the surface. The
defendant by working his seam caused
a subidence of the surface and a consequent flow of rainfall into the adjacent
lower coal field of plaintiff; and it was
held that the damage, being entirely caused
by gravitation and percolation, offered no
ground of action. In giving his opinion
in this case Lord BLACKBURN said :
"The general rule of law in both countries [Scotland and 'England] is that
the owner of one piece of land has a
right to use it in the natural course of
user, unless in so doing he interferes
with some right created either by Jaw
or contract; and as a branch of that law,
the owner of the minerals has a right
to take away the whole of the minerals
in his land, for such is the natural
course of user of minerals, and.that a
servitude to prevent such an user must
be founded on something more than
mere neighborhood." _Rjlands v.FIetcher,
L. R., 3 H. L. 338, is cited in support
of this opinion. In the latter case Lord
Chancellor CAIRNs said: "Tle occupiers of a close might lawfudly have used
that close for any purpose for which it
might in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used ; and if, in
what I term the natural user of that
land there had been any accumulation
of water either on the surface or underground, and if by the operation of the
laws of nature that accumulation of
water had passed off into the close oc-

cupied by tihe plaintiff, the plaintiff could
not have complained that that result had
taken place. If he had desired to guard
himself against it, it would have lain
upon him to have done so by leaving
or by interposing some barrier between
his close and the close of the defendants
inorder to have prevented that operation
of the laws of nature."
In Broder v. Saillard,L. R., 2 Ch.
D. 692, 700, where it was held that the
occupier of a house is liable for allowing the continuance on his premises of
any artificial work which causes a nuisance to a neighbor, even though it
was put there before he took possession,
JEssEL, Al. U., in delivering his judgment said: "The second conclusion I
came to on the question of fact is that
if the made earth had not been there
and if the soil pipe had not been broken, the dampness in question would
not have arisen; in other words, I consider the dampness to arise from the
contiguity of the made earth, and the
nature of it to be altered, and the extent
of it to be increased, as Mr. I'Anson
says, by the defect in the soil-pipe. The
result is that the defendant must be held
liable. As I understand, in the case of
the soil-pipe there is no question about
it, but as regards the wet, where does
the wet come from? I have no doubt
it comes in part, if not entirely, from
the water used in workiing the horses
and so on, for a great deal of water is
used in stables. It was suggested to me
it might come from the rain, and therefore that word was put in the bill ; but
it appears to me the most prubable origin
of the water is the waterused in the stable.
But however it comes, if itcomes through
an artificial work which collects it, in
the nature of a large artificial sponge
which absorbs it and keeps it together,
until it oozes out by reason of the nature
of the sponge, it appears to me, I have
to say, that an artificial work- a work
made by man is a work which if it
causes a nuisance is a thing for which the
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owner of the land is responsible. That
is what it comes to. Now Mr. Campbell, who was 'examined on other
points, also said, as regards this
made earth, of course it would give
away water in a very different manner from virgin clay which had never
been disturbed, and hedoes confirm the
view I should have taken independently
of his evidence, that the made earth was
the chief cause of the mischief, perhaps
not the sole cause.
That being so, I
think, both on principle and authority,
the lessee in possession of the house
where the artificial work is, ought to be
responsible for the nuisance occasioned
by the existence of that artificial work.
Therefore, even independently of the

soil-pipe, I should have thought, and
still think, the defendant must be liable
to put an end to the nuisance."
As
touching more or less upon the point
decided in the principal case, see, also,
Barring v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 95.
Vanderwiele v. Taylor, 65 N. Y. 341
Morrill v. Hurley, 120 Mass. 99; Freudenstein v.,ffeine, 6 Mo. App. 287 ; Whitney v. Sanders, 3 Pitts. 226.
Although none of the cases above
referred to decide the precise point involved in the principal case, they throw
much light upon the principles involved
therein, and upon principle therewould
seem to be no reasonable doubt as to the
correctness of its decision.
MARSALL D. EIWVELL.
Chicago.

Court of Errors and Appeals of Marfland.
THE CUMBERLAND VALLEY RAILROAD CO. v. MAUGANS.
In order to justify the court in withdrawing a question of negligence from the
jury and deciding it a matter of law, the case must be a very clear one, presenting
some prominent and decisive act in regard to the effect and character of which no
room is left for ordinary minds to differ.
It is not always as a matter of law, negligence and want of ordinary care for a
person to attempt to step from a car when it is in motion.
A young man in vigorooss health, strong, active and in full possession of all his
physical and mental faculties, having a valise containiig clothing in his right hand
and a basket of provisions on his left arm, attempted in broad daylight, to leave a
railway train while it was moving slowly, the distance from the lower step of the
car to the platform being only eighteen inches, and in doing so was seriously injured.
In an action of damages against the railroad company, Held, that under the circumstances, in voluntarily stepping from the car when it was in motion, and when he
had not the free and unrestricted use of his hands and arms, the plaintiff was not
guilty of such negligence as would justify the court in taking the case from the consideration of the jury.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Washington county.
This was an action brought by the appellee to recover damages
from the appellant for injuries he sustained through its negligence,
while stepping from one of its cars at Green Castle, a station on its
road. The plaintiff testified that he got upon a train of the
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defendant at Maugansville, where lie resided, and paid his passage to
Green Castle, a regular station on the defendant's road, in company
with his mother, an unmarried sister, a married sister, with her
husband and two children, aged four and six' years; the two children and a valise weighing from fifteen to twenty pounds, and a
basket containing provisions for his sister and children, weighing
from eight to twelve pounds, were under his charge, his sister's husband having gone, before the train stopped, to the front car to look
after his baggage, which the defendant refused to check, never having checked baggage from the Maugansville station ; that as the
train approached Green Castle, he carried said valise and basket to
a short seat near the door of the car, preparatory to leaving, and
took his position at the door with the children, with his hand upon
the knob, and at the instant the train stopped, he opened the door
and stepped one foot out on the platform and passed the children
out on the platform of the car, where some one took them and
helped them down; that he immediately turned around for the
valise and basket, as he did so, his mother and sisters immediately
followed the children out; that he picked up the valise and basket
without delay, and started to go out of the car when he met at the
door passengers coming in, which delayed him an instant, and as
soon as possible he got upon the platform of the car in which he
had been riding, with the intention of leaving the car, and in the
act of leaving the car, with the basket on his left arm and the
valise in his right hand, he then noticed that the train was beginning to move, and the steps of the platform of that car being full
of persons, he stepped as rapidly as he could to the platform of the
ear in front, and from there down the steps on to the station platform,
which was level with the track, while the train was in slow motion,
it having moved ten or twelve, or probably:fourteen feet from where
it had been standing; in stepping from the last step of said car to
the station platform, with the basket on his left arm, and valise
in his right hand, while the train was in motion as aforesaid, he fell
and was injured; that as he stepped from the platform of the car in
which he had been ridiiig, to the platform of the front car, he saw
the brakeman and assistant ticket agent, standing on the steps of that
car; he said, " Gentlemen, make room, I want to get off;" as he
passed down the steps of that car, he passed the brakeman, who
was standing on the second step, and who said to him, " Why did
you not get off sooner ?" to which he replied, "Because I could
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not;" on the third or last step, stood the assistant ticket agent,
and as he (plaintiff) passed him and was about stepping from the
last step, he (the said ticket agent) placed his hand on plaintiff's
shoulder, and said, "Be careful, you might fall ;" plaintiff supposed he put his hand on him to assist him down; that he was prevented from taking hold of the railing of the car, because the
brakeman and assistant ticket agent were standing on the steps,
with their backs against the car; that the left hand of the arm on
which he had the basket was free, with which he could have taken
hold of the rail on that side if they had not been there, and he
could have put the valise in the other hand, and would have had
his right hand free if these men had not been on the steps; in
forming the intention to get off the cars, and in the act of getting
off, he used all the care and prudence he could, and he used all
the haste and diligence he could in getting off; that he did not
give any notice to any of the defendant's agents or employees,
(except as before stated), that he intended to get off the cars, and
did not request them to stop the train after he found it was in
motion ; that he passed off the train as rapidly as he could ; no one
could have gotten off quicker ; that his intention was to get off the
train after he found it was in motion, and the action of the assistant ticket agent did not influence him in getting off the train; that
the accident would not have occurred if he had not stepped off the
train; and that it is more hazardous to attempt to get off the train
with basket and valise than without them. And farther, that
neither the conductor nor brakeman were at the steps of the car,
on the arrival of the train at Green Castle, to assist the passengers
with their children and baggage from the cars; that passengers
getting on were rushing in the cars before those destined for Green
Castle had time to get off, and that plaintiff's mother and sisters
were crowded in getting down; that the brakeman who was standing on the step when plaintiff was getting off, did not offer to stop
the train and let him off, nor did he tell plaintiff it was dangerous
to attempt to leave the car at the time he was in the act of getting
off, nor did the brakeman in any way assist, or offer to assist him
in getting off, by relieving him of his baggage, or advising him as to
how he should get off; that he did not know there was any danger
in getting off the train whilst it was moving slowly, and that if he
had known it was, he would not have gotten off.
The defendant offered evidence tending to prove that the assist-

CUMBERLAN'D VALLEY RAILROAD CO. v. MAUGANS.

521

ant ticket agent was standing on the third or last step of the car,
and that he did not notice the plaintiff until he was in the act of
getting off the last car step on to the station platform, which was
eighteen inches down from the last step; that the train had moved
at least fifty feet from where it had first stopped; that there were
eleven passengers let off the train at that station, and thirteen passengers got on the train before the ears started, and the train
reached Green Castle on time.
Prayers were offered on both sides, but their insertion is deemed
unnecessary. One of the prayers of the defendant, which the
Court, ALVEY, J., rejected, was as follows:
9. That upon the undisputed facts in this case, the plaintiff has
shown no ground of action, and therefore the verdict must be for
the defendant.
The defendant excepted to the rulings of the court, and appealed,
the verdict and judgment being for the plaintiff.
John Stewart and George W. Smith, Jr., for appellant.
J. Clarence Lane and -. H. .Reedy, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-The plaintiff in this case was a passenger to Green
Castle, an intermediate station on the defendant's road, and fell
and was injured in leaving the cars at that station, lie alleges,
and, for the purpose of determining the single question presented
by this appeal, we shall assume it to be true, that those in charge
of the train were negligent in starting it before time had been
allowed for passengers to leave in safety. There can be no question as to the duty of the defendant in this respect. A railroad
company undertaking the carriage of passengers to an intermediate
point on its road is bound to stop its trains there a sufficient length
of time to enable all passengers, whose destination is that point, to
alight, in safety.
But the undisputed facts are, that the train was in motion, and
the plaintiff knew it was moving when he stepped from it, and that
he had, at the time, a valise containing clothing which weighed
from fifteen to twenty pounds, in his right hand, and a basket containing provisions which weighed from eight to twelve pounds on
his left arm. It"is not shown that he was directed or requested or
encouraged thus to step from the car by any agent or employee of
VOL. XXXII-66
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the company, or that he would have been in any peril if he had
remained on the train, or that he was under any undue excitement
or alarm. At the trial, it was contended that by thus voluntarily
stepping from the car when he knew it was in motion, and when
he had not the free and unrestricted use of his hands and arms,
because of the luggage he was carrying, he was guilty of such
negligence as would prevent a recovery, and that the court should
so declare, and direct a verdict for the defendant. The refusal of
the court below thus to take the case from the jury presents the
only question that has been argued in this court.
Counsel for the appellant have presented their side of the question
with much ability and force of argument, but we cannot adopt their
views of the case. We agree that while the question of negligence
is ordinarily one of fact and not of law, cases do occur (and perhaps
the number of such cases is increasing) in which it becomes the
duty of the court to interpose and withdraw them from the consideration of the jury. The case, however, must. be a very clear one
to justify a court in taking upon itself this responsibility; it must
present some prominent and decisive act in regard to the effect
and character of which no room is left for ordinary minds to differ.
.Fitzpatricek's Case, 35 Md. 46; Stanbury's Case, 54 Id. 655.
Accidents occur, and injuries are inflicted under an almost infinite
variety of circumstances, and it is quqite impossible for the courts
to fix the standard of duty and conduct by a general and inflexible
rule applicable to all cases, so that a departure from it can be pronounced negligence in law. The rule that requires a party before
he crosses a railroad track to stop, look and listen for approaching
trains, which has been generally adopted by the courts,.is the only
one that approaches -universality of application in reference to a
particular class of accidents. But there is no such general accord
of judicial opinion and precedent in reference to attempts to leave
a car while it is in motion. The cases cited in the briefs of counsel on both sides- show very clearly that the weight of authority is
against the proposition that it is always, as matter of law, negligence and want of ordinary care for a person to attempt to get off
from a car when it is in motion. This proposition was pressed
upon the Court of Appeals of New York in the case of Morrison
v. Erie Railway Co., 56 N. Y. 802, but FOLGER, J., in delivering
the opinion of the court in that case, said, "were I disposed to
accede to it upon principle, which I am not, I should feel myself
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precluded by prior decisions of this court, and influenced to a contrary conclusion by those of other courts. The rule established,
and as I think the true one, is, that all the circumstances of each
case must be considered in determining whether in that case, there
was contributory negligence or want of ordinary care, and that it
is not sound to select one prominent and important fact which may
occur in many cases, and to say, that being present, there must, as
matter of law, have been contributory negligence. The circumstances vary infinitely, and always affect, and more or less control
each other. Each must be duly weighed and relatively considered
before the weight to be given to it is known."
In the present case counsel for the company rely solely upon the
prominent fact that the plaintiff attempted to leave the train while
it was in motion, and when he was so cumbered with luggage as not
to be able to use the railing on either side of the car steps as a protection or aid in stepping to the platform, and they insist that such
an act would be universally condemned by persons of ordinary
intelligence and common prudence as culpable negligence or reckless carelessness. But there are other facts and circumstances
which must be considered. The plaintiff testified (and for the purpose of the question we are considering, we must assume his testimony to be true) that at the time he made the step or jump, the
train was in slow motion, not having moved more than fourteen
feet from where it had been standing. The distance from the lower
step of the car to the platform was but eighteen inches, and it was
broad daylight at the time. He was twenty-nine years of age onthe day the accident happened, active, strong, and in vigorous
health, and a blacksmith by occupation. In our judgment these
circumstances have a very important bearing upon the question
before us, for while it may be true that every one would pronounce
it an act of reckless imprudence for a person to jump from a train
of cars when in rapid motion, or at night and in the dark, when
dangers or obstructions that could not be seen were in the way, or
for a person of impaired health and in a weak physical condition,
or of an advanced age to make the attempt when the train was in
slow motion, we do not think the same unanimity of opinion would
exist in reference to an attempt to step down eighteen inches to a
platform from a train moving very slowly, made in broad daylight
by a young man in vigorous health, strong, active, and in the full
possession of all his physical and mental faculties, even though he
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might have bad a valise in one hand and a basket in the other. It
is matter of cbmmon observation and experience that those who are
young, healthy and vigorous, frequently do acts and assume risks
which it would be culpable negligence in others of feeble health or
advanced age to attempt. At all events we are clearly of opinion
that whether there was negligence or want of ordinary care in the
conduct and acts of the plaintiff under all the circumstances of this
case, is a question in regard to which reasonable men may honestly
entertain different views. This being so, it follows that we must
sustain the refusal of the court below to withdraw the case from
the consideration of the jury, for, as has been well said by COOLEY,
0. J., Van Stimburg's Case, 1'7 Mich. 99: "When the question
arises upon a state of facts on which reasonable men may fairly
arrive at different- conclusions, the fact of negligence cannot be
determined until one or the other of these conclusions has been
drawn by the jury. The inferences to be drawn from the evidence
must either be certain and incontrovertible, or they cannot be
decided upon by the court. Negligence cannot be conclusively
established by a state of facts upon which i'air-minded men may
well differ."
This disposes of the only controversy in the case, as no objection has been urged to the rulings of the court, made upon the
assumption that the question of negligence was to be left to the
jury, and it follows that the judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
We propose to cite those cases where
the question has been answered, "when
will the court take a negligence case
from the jury ?"
No general rule. or answer to this question can be, formulated. Each case must
rest upon its own particular circumstances. The principal case is a good
illustration of this statement. The tendency, however, is to multiply the instances in which the court will hold the
commission of a certain act is negligence
per se, and take the consideration of the
case from the jury. This should be
borne in mind by those making a critical
study of the cases. The time when the
decision was rendered often becomes important.

By a study of the cases, it will be
seen what was considered a question of
fact at one time was in after times determined as one of law. This change
was caused by the frequent occurrence
of the event under similar circumstances, and this enabled the courts to
establish a rule of law. Then arose
the law in reference to negligence
per se, or negligence in law. As an
illustration, it may be observed that it
was at first a question of fact for the
jury to decide, whether a person was
guilty of negligence when crossing a railroad track, in omitting to look or listen for
an approaching train. Now it is deemed
a question of law, simply because its
frequent recurrence enable us to apply
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a rule of law. So in some jurisdictions,
the proof is so certain that it may be
on account of its frequent occurrcnce, it ruled as a question of law. If a sane
has been held negligence per se, to alight man voluntarily throws himself in confrom a moving train ; but, as we shall tact with a passing engine, there being
nothing to counteract the effect of this
see, in others not.
This state of the law is not peculiar action, it may be ruled as a matter of law
to the law of negligence. It is only be- that the injury to him resulted from his
cause the law of negligence is in vigor- own fault, and that no action can be
ous growth, that this particular branch of
sustained by him or his representatives.
it is so observable. In the early stages of So if a coach driver intentionally drives
all branches of the law, the same thing within a few inches of a precipice, and
occurred rapidly, no doubt, and is oc- an accident happen, negligence may be
curring to-day, but so slowly as not to be ruled as a question of law. On the
noticed.
See PIrofflatt on Jury Trial, other hand, if he had placed a suitable
chap. 7 ; Cooley on Torts 666 ; 2 distance between his coach and the preThompson on Negligence 1235.
cipice, but by the breaking of a rein or
Mr. Stephens, in his History of the an axle, which could not have been anCriminal Law of England, has shown ticipated, an injury occurred, it might
that advocates are permittted by the be ruled as a question of law, that there
Criminal Law of France to refer, in was no negligence and no liability. But
their arguments before the jury-both these are extreme cases, the range bethe prosecution and defence-to other tween them is almost infinite in variety
cases of a similar import where the jury and extent. It is in relation to these
either acquitted or convicted.
No intermediate cases that the opposite rule
doubt, in time, these cases, by frequent prevails. Upon the facts proven in such
quotation, and the recurrence of like cases, it is a matter of judgment and
instances, will become settled rules of
discretion, of sound inference, what is
law as to the facts therein stated being the deduction to be drawn from the un
regarded per se a crime. This is pro- disputed facts. Certain facts we may
bably a very fair illustration of what our suppose to be clearly established from
criminal practice was at a very early which one sensible, impartial man would
time, and of the beginning of settled infer that proper care had not been
used, and that negligence existed; anorules of our criminal law.
In speaking of this subject, the. Su- ther man, equally sensible and equally
preme Court of the United States said, by impartial, would infer that proper care
HUNT, J. : "It is true, in many cases, had been used, and that there was no
that where the facts are undisputed the negligence. It is this class of cases and
effect of them is for the judgment of the those akin to it that the law commits to
court, and not for the decision of the the decision of a jury. Twelve men of
jury. This is true in that class of cases the average of the community, compriswhere the existence of such facts come ing men of education, and men of little
in question rather than where deductions education, men of learning and men
or inferences are to be made from the whose learning consists only in what
facts. If a deed be given in evidence, a they have themselves seen and heard,
contract proven, or its breach testified the merchant, the mechanic, the farner,
to, the existence of such deed, contract, the laborer, there sit together, consult,
or breach, there being nothing in dero- apply their separate experience of affairs
gation of the evidence, is no doubt to be of life to the facts proven, and draw a
ruled as a question of law. In some unanimous conclusion. This average
cases, too, the necessary inference from judgment then given it is the great effort
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of the law to obtain. It is assumed that
twelve men know more of the common
affair of life than does one man, that
they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts there occurring
than a single judge. In no class of
cases can this practical experience be
more wisely applied than in that we are
considering. We find, accordingly, although not uniform or harmonious, that
the authorities justify us in holding in
the case before us, that although the facts
are undisputed it is for the jury and not
for the judge to determine whether proper
care was given, or whether they establish negligence :" Railroad Co. v. Stout,
17 Wall. 657, 663; see Robson v. The
N. E. Ry. Co., L. R., 10 Q. B. 271;
a. c. 12 Moak's Rep. 302.
"The fact of negligence is generally
an inference from many facts and cireumstances, all of which it is the province of the jury to find. It can very
seldom happen that the question is so
clear from doubt that the court can undertake to say, as matter of law, that
the jury could not fairly and honestly
find for the plaintiff. It is not the duty
of the court, in such cases any more than
in any other, to usurp the province of
the jury and pass upon the facts. And
the nonsuit should only he granted in
such cases where the evidence of the
misconduct on the part of the injured
party is so clear and irresistible as to
put the case on a par with those cases
where a nonsuit is granted for a failure
to introduce evidence sufficient to go to
the jury upon some point essential to the
plaintiff's case. The fact must be so
cAr that, looking upon the plaintiff's
case in the most favorable light, and
giving him the benefit of all controverted
questions, the court can see that a verdict
in his favor must nedessarily, be set
aside:" Schierhold v. North Beach 4Mis.ton Railroad Co., 40 Cal. 447 ; see
.Tantson v. San Jose 4- Santa Clara
Railroad Co., 55 Cal. 593; s.c. 3 Am.
& Eng. Railroad Cas. 350.

"It by no means necessarily follows,
because there is no conflict in the testimony, that the court is to decide the
issue between the parties as a question of law. The fact of negligence is
very seldom established by such direct
and positive evidence that it can be
taken from the consideration of the jury
and pronounced upon as a matter of law.
On the contrary, it is almost to be deduced as an inference of fact from several
facts and circumstances disclosed by the
testimony, after their connection and
relation to the matter in issue have been
traced, and their weight and force considered.
In such cases the inference
cannot be made without the intervention
of a jury, although all the witnesses
agree in their statements, or there be but
one statement, which is consistent
throughout:" Ireland v. lank Road
Co., 13 N. Y. 533.
" Generally, what is and what is not
negligence is a question for the jury.
When the standard of duty is a shifting
one, a jury must determine what it is,
as well as find whether it has been complied with:" Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. Barnett, 59 Penn. St. 263.
"Negligence, in one sense, is a quality
attaching to acts dependent upon, and
arising out of the duties and relations of
the parties concerned, and is as much a
fact to be found by the jury as the
alleged acts to which it attaches by virtue of such duties and relations :" T. 6R. 1 y. Co. v, Murphy, 46 Tex. 366.
."Direct and positive evidence of
negligence as a fact is not required.
Any circumstances which tend to prove
it, or from which it may he reasonably
inferred are sufficient. And when such
evidence has been given on the trial of
an action, it is not for the court to usurp.
the disposition of the fact by 6rdering a
nonsuit. Such an order should not be
made unless there is no evidence at all,
or a mere scintilla of evidence wholly insufficient for the consideration of the
jury, or unless the facts are agreed upon
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or admitted, and in the judgment of the
court, are insufficient to constitute a
cause of action. Upon facts admitted,
or proved and found, it is the duty of
the court to say what the law applicable
to them is. But where negligence, as
the essential fact inthe case, is disputed,
and tile
evidence of it is conflicting, or
consists of circumstances from which inferences may be drawn for or against it,
it is the province of tile
jury to determine, under instructions by the court,
whether tile
evidence establishes it as the
proximate cause of the injury complained of:" Wilson v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co., 9 Am. & Eng. Railroad
Cas: 161 ; s. c. 7 Id. 400.
In another case it was said that " the
theory of our judicial system is that
questions of fact are for the jury, and
questions of law for the court. When,
therefore, all the facts essential to the
plaintiff's case are agreed or established
by uncontradicted evidence, nothing remains but for the court to decide whether
there was negligence. But unless all the
essential facts are agreed or proved without contradiction, the court cannot decide
whether there was negligence or not:"
Dolfinger v. Fishback, 12 Bush 478 ; see
Paducah 6- Elizabettown Railroad Co. v.
Letcher, 12 Am. & Eng. Cas. 61.
These quotations sufficiently show that
the courts are not in harmony-upon any
general rule. Where the facts are in
dispute, aside from the fact of negligence,
all tile
courts agree that the finding of
the facts is a question for the jury, but
on the question whether or not the court
should decide whether the facts, after tme
jurylhas found them, constitute negligence,
there is a wide divergence in the cases.
Tile Michigan case, quoted from in the
principal case, lays down the correct and
reasonable rule ;and this rule has been
adhered to by many courts : see Railroad
Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657; Patterson v.
Wallace, 1 MeQucen, H. L. Cas. 748;
Mlaugam v. Brooklyn Railroad,38 N. Y.
455 ; Quimby v. Vermont Cent. Railroad,
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23 Vt. 387 : Pfau v. Reynolds, 53 Ill.
212 ; Catawissa Railroad Co. v. Armstrong, 52 Penn. St. 282.
The better opinion is that in order to
justify the withdrawal of a case from the
jury, the facts of the case should not
only be undisputed, but the conclusion to
be drawnfrom those facts be indisputable.
If different minds may honestly draw
different conclusions from facts admitted
or undisputed, the case should properly
go to the jury. This doctrine is admirably stated by Judge COOLEY in F'an
Stimbury's Case, quoted in tie principal
case. This is also the doctrine adopted
in the principal case: see Treat v. Boston, 4-c., Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 371
I1rohlfahrt v. Beckert, 27 Hun 74.
Certain questions come within the law
which courts are entitled to withdraw
from the jury. Thus where the facts are
undisputed, whether the person causing
the injury is to be regarded as a fellowservant, is a question for the court.
Such a rule is necessary to secure uniformity of decision: .4cGowan v. St.
Louis, 4-c., Railroad Co., 61 Mo. 326;
Whalen v. Centennary Church, 62 Id.
326; Cook v. Hannibal, 4-c., Railroad
Co., 63 Id. 397 ; M1arshall v. Schricker,
63 Id. 308; ilouser v. Chicago, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 8 Am. & Eng. Cas. 500.
If the facts are disputed the case becomes one for the jury under instructions
of the court: Potter v. Chicago Railroad
Co., 46 Iowa 399 ; Paducah 4- Elizabethtown Railroad Co. v. Letcher, 12 Am. &
Eng. Railroad Cas. 61; Williams v.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 11 Id. 421 ;
Goodwin v. Chicago, 4-c., Railroad Co.,
75 Mo. 73 ; s. c. 11 Am. & Eng. Railroad Cas. 460 ; Yarvall v. St. Louis,
4-c., Ry. Co., 75 Mo. 575 ; s. c. 10
Am. & Eng. Railroad Cas. 726 ; WJ'ashington v. B. 4- 0. Railroad Co., 17 IV.
Va. 190 ; s. c. 10 Am. & Eng. Railroad Cas. 749 ; Philadelphia, cJ'c., Railroad Co. v. State, 58 Md. 372; s. c.
10 Am. & Eng. Railroad Cas. 792;
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9 Am. & Eng. Railroad Cas. 161;
Payne v. Troy 4- Boston Railroad Co.,
83 N. Y. 572; 6 Am. & Eng. Railroad
Cas. 54; Philadelphia, 4-c., Railroad
Co. v. Schertle, 2 Am. & Eng. Railroad Cases 158 ; Philadelphia, 4-c.,
Railroad Co. v. Boyer, 2 Am. & Eng.
Railroad Cas. 172; Terre Haute, 4-.,
Railroad Co. v. Jones, 11 Ill. App. 322 ;
Chicago, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Clark, 11
Id. 104; Wabash, 4-c., Ry. Co. v. Shacklet, 105 fll. 364; Bell v. N. Y. Cent.,
4-c., Railroad Co., 29 Hun 560; Goodrich v. Pennsylvanza, &e., Canal Co., 29
Id. 50; Griffln v. Auburn, 58N. H. 121;
Tuttle v. Farmington, 58 Id. 13; Hall v.
Union Pacific Ry. Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 744.
Jumping front Moving Trains.-It is
obvious td a man of the most ordinary
understanding that to jump from a train
moving vpry slowly is not necessarily a
negligent act. If the person so jumping
is a man in full health, unmaimed and
unencumbered, and the landing place is
smooth and convenient for lighting, it is
difficult to see how it is an act of negligence to step from the train while moving at a very slow rate. Such is done
every day. It is every day experience,
and but few of those attempting it under
such circumstances, are injured, in comparison with those successfully performing the act. For an old man, or one injured in his feet, or one heavily encumbered with baggage, or a woman who is
necessarily clogged with hei clothing, or
a small child, to do so might be an act
of negligence. But upon this those who
will witness tke act may differ in their
opinion whether it is one of negligence.
In such instances it is quite obvious that
the question of negligence must be left to
the jury, and that no other person or
body of men is so adequate to pass upon
the question. What we have said is
peculiarly applicable to the principal
case. Under the facts narrated, it is
difficult to see how the court could say
as a matter of law that the plaintiff was
guilty of negligence.

In an Indiana case it was said, that
"It is carelessness in passengers to attempt to leave the train whilst it is in
motion' I Jeffersonville Railroad Co. v.
Hendricks, 26 Ind. 228. But on a second appeal that proposition was deemed
to have been " too broadly stated, and
should have been qualified :" Jeffersonville, Madison and Indianapolisv. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 49. And in another case
it was said : "If the leap was made under such circumstances that a person of
ordinary caution and care would not
have apprehended danger therefrom,
then it was not such an act of carelessness as would relieve the defendant from
the responsibility otherwise resting upon
it :" Evansville 4- Crawfordsville Railroad Co. 7. Duncan, 28 Ind. 441, 447
Morrison v..Erie Ry. Co., 56 N. Y. 302;
McIntyre v. N. Y. C. Railroad, 37 Id.
287 ; Filer v. N. Y. C. Railroad,49 Id.
47.
WThere are risks which the most prudent men will take, and the plaintiff will
not be barred of a recovery for his injury, if he adopted the course which
most prudent men would take under simi"lar circumstances. For a person to jump
from a car, propelled by steam when it
is in rapid motion, may be regarded as
mere recklessness; but to step from a
car not yet beyond the platform, and
whose motion is so slight as to be almost
or quite imperceptible, may not be negligence, and whether it is or not, is for the
jury to decide from the physical condition of the person, and all the attendant
circumstances. A young, healthy and
vigorous man may assume risks which
would be culpable negligence in another
of feeble health or protracted age: I
Doss v. Missouri, K. 4- T. Railroad Co.,
59 Mo. 27.
Where a lad of seventeen jumped
from a street car in rapid motion, it was
held to be error to instruct the jury that
such an act was negligence per se:
Wyatt v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 55 Mo. 485.
Generally to the same effect, see Lloyd
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v. Hannibal 6- St. Joseph Railroad Co.,
53 Mo. 509 (a female); Johnson v.
West Chester, 4-c., Railroad Co., 70
Penn. St. 357 ; Curtis v. Detroit 4- 11ilwaukee Railroad Co., 27 Wis. 158 (getting aboard train); Toledo, -c., 1ig.
Co. v. Baddeley, 54 Ill. 19 ; Mfulhado v.
D'ooklyn, 6-c., Railroad Co., 30 N. Y.
370. Nichols v. Sixth Avenue Railroad,
38 Id. 131 ; Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
v. Kilgore, 32 Penn. St. 292; Robson
v. North Eastern By. Co., L. R., 10 Q.
B. 271 ; s. c. 12 Moak Rep. 302.
Where the plaintiff's father took her
in his arms and stepped down, when the
train was slowly moving, from the carstep, in the night; and his only incentive for so doing was to avoid being carried beyond the station, it was held that
the court should not have submitted the
question to the jury. His act was negligenee per se: Mforrison v. Erie By. Co.,
56 N. Y. 302 ; Lucas v. Taunton 4- New
Bedford Railroad Co., 6 Gray 64 (negligence per se, but case was not taken from
the jury).
'Where plaintiff had ample time to
alight at his station, but failed to do so
until the train started, it was held that
he could not recover, and a favorahle
verdict was set aside: Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Slatton, 54 11. 133.
This is evidently one of those cases
whore the court, under the theory of the
evidence adopted, could have directed a
verdict for defendant.
There is quite a material difference
between an instance where the plaintiff
has not had time to alight, and where he
alights before the train has stopped,
knowing or being assured by the officers
of the company, that it will stop; or
where he has had full time and opportunity to alight, and has failed to do so
until after the train starts. In the first
instance the inconvenience of being carried beyond the station is often taken as
a palliation of his want of care, but
where he alights before the train stops,
knowing or being informed that it will
VOL. XXXII.-67
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stop, ie has little or no excuse. In such
a case a new trial was granted, although
there was really no conflict in the evidence: Ohio 4- Mississippi By. Co., 78
II1. 88; s. c. 3 Cent. L. J. 415;
Ohio 4- Miss. Railroad Co. v. Sdiebe,
44 Il1. 460.
If the train is in rapid motion, leaping
from the train is negligence per se;
although it is undetermined where a slow
becomes a rapid motion: Dougherty v.
C., B. 4- Q. Railroad Co., 86 Ill. 467 ;
Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Penn. St.
147.
Where notices were posted up forbidding passengers to alight while the train
was in motion, and it appeared that the
plaintiff was old, and started to alight
while the train was in motion, it was
held (distinguishing _7ler v. N. Y. C.
Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 47) that the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence, and a
new trial was granted: Burrows v. Erie
Railroad Co., 63 N. Y. 556 ; Gavett v.
Hanchester 6- Lawrence Railroad Co., 16
Gray 501 (an aged female).
Crossing Railroad Tracks.-Formerly
it was a question of fact whether one
crossing a railroad track by omitting to
look or listen for an approaching train
was guilty of negligence.
It is now deemed purely a question of
law. and if the evidence shows that the
injured person could have seen or heard
the approaching train, and this is uncontradicted, the court is justified, as a matter of law, in instructing the jury that
the person so injured was guilty of such
negligence as prevents a recovery, or
withdrawing the case from their consideration: Chicago, B. 6- Q. Railroad
Co. v. Van Patten, 64 Ill. 510 ; Chicago,
B. 6- Q. Railroad Co. v. Daomerell, 81
Id. 450; s. c. 3 Cent. L. J. 768; Rockford, R. I and St. L. Railroad Co.
v. Byam, 80 Id. 528 ; Toledo, IV. 4-WT.
Railway Co. v. Miller, 76 Id. 278 ;
Belleontaine Railway Co. v. Hunter, 33
Ind. 335; Alyn v. Boston .V- Albany
Railroad Co., 105 Mass. 77; Morse v.
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Erie Railway Co., 65 Barb. 490; Mitch- clare as a matter of law that crawling
ell v. N. Y Cent. 4- Hudson Railroad under a train slowly moving, or even
Co., 2 Han 535; s. 0. 5 N. Y. s. c.
while standing still, is negligence per se:
(T. & C.) 123; C., C. C. 4- I. Railway
Ostertag v. Pacific Railroad Co., 64 Mo.
Co. v. Elliott, 28 Ohio St. 340 ; Railroad 421 ; Central,4-c., Railroad Co. v.Dixon,
Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697; s. C. 6
42 Geo. 327 ; C., B. 4- Q. Railroad Co.
Cent. L. J. 132 ; ];letcher v. Atlantic &k v. Dewey, 26 Ill. 255 ; Lewis v. B. 4Pacific RailroadCo., 64 Mo. 484 ; Lake
0. Railroad Co., 38 Md. 588 ; Stillson
Shore, 4-c.,* Railroad Co. v. Miller, 25
v. iHannibal 4- St. Joseph Railroad Co.,
Mich. 274.
Although a severe storm
67 Mo. 671 ; s. c. 7 Cent. L. J. 107.
was prevailing, and the bell did not
In case of a child or person of less
ring, nor the whistle blow, he cannot
than ordinary mind, the rule is, perhaps,
recover. On this case the plaintiff's own
different: C., B. 6- Q. Railroad Co. v.
testimony showed the above state of
Dewey, 26 Ill. 255 ; C. 4- N. W. Railfacts; and it was held error not to have road Co. v. Coss, 73 Id. 394; JcA~ahoa
directed a verdict for the defendant : But- v. North. Central Railway Co., 39 Md.
terfield v. Western RailroadCo., 10 Allen
438.
532 ; Ernstv. Hudson, 6-c., RailroadCo.,
Riding on CarPlatform.-Ridingupon
39 N. Y. 61.
the platform when the car is in motion,
Recklessly crossing a railroad track in
even with the consent of the conductor
front of a train plainly in view, although
or brakeman, is negligence per se:
the injured person is mistaken in his Hickey v. Boston 6- Lowell Railroad Co.,
calculation of distance and the speed
14 Allen 429, and where a case of the
of train, is negligence per se ; T., W. kind was taken from the jury it was
4- W. Railroad Co. v. Jones, 76 Ill. held not to be such an error as to re312 ; hcago, R. L 4 P.Railroad Co. verse the case: Quinn v. Illinois Cent.
v. Bell, 70 Id. 102.
Railroad Co., 51 Ill. 495.
Where the plaintiff alighted at a staAria projecting.-In Barton v. St.
tion in the night on the wrong side of
Louis, 4-c., Railroad Co., 52 Mo. 253,
the train, on a platform, and was injured there was evidence tending to show that
while crossing from the platform to the the plaintiff had his arm outside the car
window at the time of the accident, and
highway by a locomotive silently backing
the court held that this was not negliupon him, which he did not see, it was held
that if the evidence had any tendency to gence per se; whether it contributed to
show, according to the general knowlthe injury was a question for the jury.
edge and experience of men, that the A similar ruling was made in Chicago,
situation, arrangement and use of the J-c., Railroad Co. v. Pondrom, 51 111.
premises were such as to invite the plain333.
In Spencer v. Milwaukee, 4-c.,
tiff to cross to the highway in the manRailroad Co., 17 Wis. 487, it was held
ner in wlich he attempted to do so,
that such a case was properly left to the
that he used ordinary care in the atjury to determine, under all the circumtempt, and that the defendants had not
stances of the case, whetler the plaintiff
provided proper safe-guards against
was guilty of negligence in respect to
such an accident, the questions whether
the position of the arm,, disapproving
there was due care on the part of the- Todd v. Old Colony, &c., Railroad Co.,
plaintiff, and negligence on the part of
3 Allen 18; a. c. 7 Id. 207.
the defendants, were for the jury: GayIn other cases such an act is held to
nor v.Old Colony, 4-c., Railway Co., 100
be negligence per se: Indianapolis,4-c.,
Mass. 208.
Railroad Co. v. Rutherford, 29 Ind. 82;
Crawlingunder Train.-Courtswill deHolbrook v. Utica, 4-c., Railroad Co., 12
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N. Y. 236; Louisville Railroad Co. v.
Sidkings, 5 Bush 1; Pittsburgh, 4.c.,
Railroad Co. v. Andrews, 39 Md. 329;
Pittsburgh,4-c., Railroad Co. v. 3 cClurg,
56 Penn. St. 300; forel v. Mississippi
fins. Co., 4 Bush 535; Winters v. Hannibal, &c., Railroad Co., 39 Mo. 468;
Todd v. Old Colony, &.c., Railroad Co.,
3 Allen 18.
Landing at place not designedfor Passenger.-The deceased got off on the
wrong side of the car, where another
track was laid ; and was run over and
killed by a fast running train. There
was ample opportunity to get off on the
other side of the platform. His vision
was poor, and he could only see ninety
or a hundred feet. His hearing was
good. The train moved with great noise.
A verdict was directed in favor of the
defendant, and this was held proper.
The court said : " Contributory negligence is undoubtedly a question of fact,
and whenever it is to be determined
upon conflicting evidence, or upon a
state of facts which, though undisputed,
is not conclusive for the reason that
fair-minded men may well differ as to
the inferences to be properly drawn
therefrom, it must be submitted to the
jury and determined by them.
But
where the evidence is not only undisputed as to a certain state of facts, but
clear and convincing and ad.mitting of
but one conclusion, it is nob only the
right, but the duty of the court to say,
on a motion for a nonsuit or for the
direction of a verdict, that, as a matter
of law, the fact involved therein, viz.,
the existence of contributory negligence,
has been sufficiently proven :' Gonzales
v. iV. Y. 6. HI. Railroad Co., 50 How.
Pr. 126 : Lewis v. London, &.c., failroad
Co., L. R., 9 Q. B. 66; Bancroft v.
Boston 4- Worcester Railroad Co., 97
Mass. 275; Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
v. Zebe, 33 Penn. St. 318; s. c. 37 Id.
420.
Blowing whistle or ringing bell.-If no
statute requires the ringing of the bell
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or blowing of the whistle on approaching
a crossing, it is a question for the jury
whether ;uch omission amounts to negligence on the part of the railroad company: Galena 4- Chicago Railroad Co.
v. Dill, 22 Ill. 264 ; Toledo, 4-c., Railway Co. v. Riley, 47 Ill. 514 ; Bellefontaine Railway Co. v. Hunter, 33 Ind.
335; Artz v. Ch., R. L &.P. Railroad
Co., 34 Ia. 154; Meek v. Pennsylvania Co., 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
643.
Although it is negligence perse, where
a statute requires the blowing of the
whistle or ringing of the bell on approaching a public crossing, to omit such
warning yet it is not sufficient to make
the company liable, unless it is a
just inference from the evidence that
the injury is caused by the reason
of such neglect.
Necessarily, then,
the question of negligence is one
for the jury : Chicago, B. 4- Q. Railroad Co. v. Lee, 68 I1. 576; Chicago,
R. 1. 4- P. Railroad Co. v. Bell, 70 Id.
102 ; Karle v. Kansas City, 4-c., Railroad Co., 55 Mo. 476; C., C. C. 4. L
Railway Co. v. Elliott, 28 Ohio St. 340;
Leavenworth, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Rice,
10 Kans. 426.
Defect in Iiighway.-A person who
voluntarily attempts to pass over a sidewalk or highway which he knows to be
very dangerous, by reason of ice upon.
it, when he might easily avoid it, is guilty
of negligence per se; and a verdict may
be directed against him : Wilson v. City
of Charleston, 8 Allen 137 ; see Gramlich
v. Railroad Co., 9 Phila. 78.
But usually the question whether a par
ticular condition of the street or sidewalk, when considered in respect to the
grade or manner of construction, amounts
to a defect or not, is one of fact, to be
determined by the jury from the evidence : Jc&laugh v. illuaukee, 32 Wis.
200; s. c. 6 Rep. 799; Hammond v.
Mukwa, 40 Wris. 35 ; Cremer v. Portland,
36 Id. 92 ; itll v. Lowell, 10 Cush.
260.
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Whether notice can be inferred from
the length of time the defect has existed,
is purely a question' for the jury; and
the court cannot as a matter of law declare the length of time it must have
existed in order to charge the city or
town with constructive notice: Colley
v.Wstbrook, 57 Me. 181; Bradbury v.
Falmouth, 18 Me. 64.
Failure to perform a statutory duty.In cases of ringing the bell, or of blowing the whistle, of a locomotive at the
crossing of a highway, it has been seen
that a failure to do is not such negligence as will entitle the plaintiff to recover. He himself must not be guilty
of contributory negligence. But such a
failure, however, is negligenee per se
when a statute requires it to be done.
And it may be stated generally that
where a statute requires a certain thing
to be done the omission to do it is negligence per se; but that of itself does
not entitle the court to direct a verdict :
Worcester v. Canal Bridge, 16 Pick. 541;
Heard v. Hall, Id. 457 ; Karle v. Kansas City, 4-c., Railroad Co., 55 Mo. 476;
Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100
Mass. 156 ; Worcester v. Forty-second
Street Railroad Co., 50 N. Y. 203;
France v. Erie Railroad Co., 2 Hun
513.
If an act is inperative, a failure to
obey it will justify the court to instruct
that such failure is negligence per se :
Atlanta, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Wyly, 4
Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 262.
Contributory negligence.-The question
of contributory negligence is to be determined under the same limitation as the
question whether there has been negligence on the part of the defendant. It
is a question of fact for the jury, unless
it is so clearly established as to justify
the court in granting a nonsuit : Pennsylvania, 4-c., Railroad Co. v.Righter, 42
N. J. L. 180; s. c. 2 Am. & Eng. R.
R. Cas. 220; Mac Dougal v. Central
PacificRailroad Co., 12 Id. 143 ; Nragel
v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 75 Mo.

653; s. c. 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
702 ; Herbert v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 8 Id. 85 ; Cololado Central
Railroad Co. v. Holmes, 5 Col. 197 ; s.
c. 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 410 ; Houser v. Chicago, 9-c., Railroad Co., 8 Id.
500 ; Wilson v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Co., 7 Id. 400 ; KansasPacific Railway
Co. v. Richardson, 25 Kans. 391 ; s. c.
6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 96; Pennsylvania Company v. Conlan, 101 Ill. 93;
s. c. 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 243; Toronley v. Chicago, 4-c., Railroad Co., 5
Id. 562; Bell v. Hannibal, Co., Railroad Co., 72 Mo. 50; s. c. 4 Am. &
Eng. R. R. Cas. 580; Wabash Railway
Co. v. Elliott, 98 Ill, 481 ; a. c. 4 Am.
& Eng. 651 ; .Jamison v. San Jose, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 55 Cal. 593 ; s. c. 3 Am.
& EnBg. R. R. Cas. 350; Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118, 124; New Jersey
Express Co. v. Nichols, 32N. J.L. 166;
Seigel v. Eisen, 41 Cal. 109 ; Brown v.
European, 4c., Railroad Co., 58 Me.
384; Kansas Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Brady, 17 Kans. 380; Parkv. O'Brien,
23 Conn. 339 ; Norton v. Iitner, 56 Mo.
351 ; International,6-c., Railroad Co. v.
K!indred, 57 Tex. 491 ; Payne v. Reese,
100 Penn. St. 301 ; Crowley v. Palen,"
65 How. Pr. 435 ; Sleeper v. Worcester,
4-c., Railroad Co., 58 N. H. 520; Bierback v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 14 Fed.
Rep. 826; s. c. 15 Id. 490; Central
Railroad Co. v. Freeman, 66 Geo. 170.
If, however, the undisputed facts show
negligence on the part of plaintiff contributory to the accident, a nonsuit or
verdict for the defendant may be directed ; and even though, in order to do
so the court must necessarily find an
affirmative fact-that there was "contributory negligence: Flemming v. Western
Pacific Railroad Co., 49 Cal. 253;
Mackey v. Cent. Railroad Co., 27 Barb.
528 ; Gahagan v. Boston 4- Lowell Railroad Co., 1 Allen 187 ; Curren v. Warren Manufacturing Co., 36 N. Y. 153;
Owen v. Hudson River Railroad Co., 35
Id. 516 ; New Jersey Express Co. v.
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man may always he given to the jury
as one of the ci-cumstances tending to
show negligence: McGrath v. N. Y.
31iwaukee, 6-c., Railroad Ga., 21 Id.
Cent. Railroad Co., 59 N. Y. 468 ; a. c.
293 ; 3fcQuil:en v. CentralPacific Rail- 63 Id. 522 ; 17 Am. Rep. 359 ; Casey
v. N. Y. Cent., 4.c., Railroad Co., 78
road Co., 50 Cal. 7.
Where different minds may draw dif- N. Y. 518; Pittsburgh, 6'c.,
Railway Co.
ferent conclusions from the same facts, v. Yundt, 78 Ind. 373; s. c. 41 Am.
the question of contributory negligence Rep. 580; Hart v. Chicago, 6-c., Railshould be left to the jury, the same as road Co., 56 Ia. 166; a. c. 41 Am.
any other question of negligence under Rep. 93 ; Welsch v. Hannibal,6-c., Railthe same circumstances.
road Co., 72 Ao. 451 ; a. c. 37 Am.
Even though there be controversy in Rep. 440 ; New Jersey, 6-c., Transp. Co.
the evidence as to some facts, yet, if v. West, 32 N. J. L. 91 ; Penn. Railroad
those that -re uncontroverted clearly
Co. v. Ofatthews, 36 Id. 531 ; Cliff" v.
and indisputably establish negligence, it
llidland Railroad Co., L. R., 5 Q. B.
is still a question of law for the court : 258.
Abbett v. Chicago, J4e., Railroad Co., 30
Instances.-The plaintiff's intestate,
Minn. 482 ; see Stratton v. Central City desiring to purchase a "black draught,"
Horse Railway Co., 95 I1. 25 ; s. c. 1 asked the druggist for "black drops,"
which the druggist told him was a poiAm. &Eng. R. R. Cas. 115.
lfWalkinq on railroadtrac.-To walk son, and finally put them up in a bottle
on a rallroad track and not use the labelled "black drops," but having
sense of sight and hearing to detect the nothing on it to indicate the dose, or
approach of trains, is negligence per se, that the mixture was a poison. It was
and the court will so instruct the jury ; held that the court erred in not leaving
and in the absence of their use, upon it to the jury to say whether the drugclear proof, direct a verdict in favor of
gist was guihy of negligence : Vohlfahrt
the railroad company: Yarnall v. St. v. Beckert, 27 Hun 74.
Lois, 4-c., Railroad Co., 75 Mo. 575
In an action for injuries caused by a
s. c. 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 726.
difference in height betwecen two ad.
Sar.-It cannot as a matter of law joining walks, it was held that the quesbe declared that a less degree of care tion whether such construction was negis required of a woman than a man. ligent was for the jury: Osage City v.
The rule of reasonable care knoivs noth- Brown, 27 Kans. 74.
ing of sex : Hichigan Cent. RailroadCo.
An agent returning on the cars by
v. Hasseneger, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. night with money for his principal, gave
Cas. 59 ; see Tuckerv. Henniker, 41 N. an acquaintance several of the small
H. 317; Bloominqton v. Pardue, 99 Ill. bills in exchange for a large one, and
329; Snow v. Provincetown, 120 Mass. on reaching his destination immedi580.
ately deposited the money with a brother
Flagman at crossings.-In an action of his principal.
In the morning one
against a railroad company for an acci- bill was found missing. It was held
dent at a crossing, it was held error to that the question of negligence was one
leave it the jury to determine whether of fact: Darling v. Younker, 37 Ohio St.
the omission to have a flagman at the 487 ; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 532.
point was negligence: Houghkirlc v.
Whether one injured while standing
President, ,'-c., Ddaware, EN., Co., 92 upon the platform of a horse car was
N. Y. 219 ; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 370.
guilty of negligence in being there, was
Evidence of the absence of the flag- held to be a question for the jury, upon
hkhols, 32 N. i. L. 166; s. c. 33 Id.
434; Brown v. Milicaukee, J-c., Railroad Co., 22 Miun. 165 ; Donaldson v.
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all the circumstances of the case : Chi- court charged, that if the driver saw the
cago West Divw Railway Co. v. Klauber, child in the street approaching the car,
and in such close proximity that it
9 Ill. App. 613.
might reach the track before the car
It is a question for the jury whether
a special train can be run without neg- passed, it was negligence on his part not
ligence at such a high rate of speed as to stop ; it was held that this was error;
to make it difficult to check the same and that the standard of duty in such a
case was a shifting one, and for the jury:
within a reasonable time and distance:
Marcott v. Marquette, 4-c., Railroad Co. Phila. City Pass. Railway Co. v. Henrice,
92 Penn. St. 431 ; s. 0. 37 Am. Rep.
47 Mich. 1.
An old man who was somewhat deaf, 699; see Mauerman v. Siemerts, 71 Mo.
101; Johnson v. Chicago, J-c., Railway
while driving a span of colts towards
a railroad track down a narrow road Co., 49 Wis. 529 ; s. c. I Am. & Eng.
from which the track was concealed on R. R. Cas. 155.
Remarks.-In many cases the distincone side'by a high embankment, stopped
tion drawn in the principal case-where
to listen, but hearing nothing drove on,
and when close by the track a train ap- the facts are uncontradicted, and the
peared within a few rods. Fearing he question of negligence to be drawn from
could not control his horses where they those facts-is not alluded to, and eviwere, he tried to cross the track, and dently has been overlooked. Such cases
was struck by the engine. It was held must be read in the light of this fact.
that the question of contributory negli- In otheri, however, it is clear that no
gence was one for the jury : Chicago, such distinction was recognised as legit4-c., Railway Co. v. Miller, 46 Mich. imate, and it was repudiated.
532.
W. W. Tseome'ror.
Crawfordsville, Ind.
In an action against a street railway
company for the injury of a child, the
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BURT v. WINONA & ST. P. RAILROAD COMPANY..
There may be a de facto court or office, tie legality of which cannot be called
in question, except in a direct proceeding by the state for state purposes.
Where a court or office is established by a legislative act apparently valid, and
the court has gone into operation, or the office is filled and exercised under the act
it is a de facto court or office.
The courts do not take judicial notice of the journal of the legislature.
When an enrolled bill is signed by the presiding officer of each house, and approved by the governor, if the subject-matter of it is within the constitutional
power of the legislature, it is prima facie a valid law ; if it assumes to create a
court, the court is prima fade legal.

APPEAL from an order of the Mankato Municipal Court denying
defendant's motion for a new trial.
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Daniel Buck, for respondent.
Wilson &fGale, for appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GiLFILLAN, C. J.-After the appeal in this case had been
argued and submitted, but before it was decided, the appellant
applied to the court, asking it to "disaffirm" the judgment
appealed from, on the alleged ground that the court rendering it is not a legal court, and its judgment is therefore a nullity, because the act assuming to establish it, to wit, the Act of
November 22d 1881, entitled "an act to establish a municipal
court in the city of Mankato, 13lue Earth county. Minnesota,"
did not receive a vote of two-thirds of the entire senate in its passage through that body, and consequently did not pass according
to the requirements of the constitution as construed by the court at
this term in the case of State v. Gould, 17 N. W. Rep. 276. To
establish the fact it refers to the journal of the senate, and claims
that the courts take judicial notice of the journals of the legislathre
in respect to the passage of bills.
The plaintiff answers that the court, if not a de .Jure, was at
least a de facto court, and its acts and judgments cannot be impeached collaterally for want of legality in the court itself, nor its
legal existence be called in question, except in a direct proceeding
'on behalf of the state for that purpose, as was the case in the State
v. Gould, supra.
The argument of the defendant is that a judgment rendered
without jurisdiction is void; that want of jurisdiction may always
be shown ; that if the legislative act under which the court assumes
to act as such be void, there is a want of jurisdiction ; and that this
act being void there was no jurisdiction. Ordinarily, if the record
shows that a court has assumed jurisdiction over a matter not committed to it by the constitution or some valid statute, it may be
inquired into and the excess of jurisdiction corrected or annulled
on appeal from its judgment. The defect here alleged is in the
non-existence, in the law, of the court itself. That presents asomewhat different case from an exception to the right of a court,
admitted to exist, to try a particular matter; the latter is permitted,
while public policy may prohibit the other.
The rule that the acts of de facto officers cannot be questioned
collaterally, includes the acts of judicial as fully as of other officers.
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In State v. Brum, 12 Minn. 538, the court held that the judge
who held the court below, at the trial of the defendant, was at
least a de facto officer, and that until his right to the office should
be determined in a direct proceeding for that purpose, it could
not be questioned in a collateral proceeding. Many of the definitions of a de facto officer in the text-books and decided cases
assume that there can be no de facto officer, except in a de jure
office; and Dill. Mun. Corp., § 276, goes so far as to say, "in
order that there may be a de facto officer, there must be a de jure
office; and the notion that there can be a de facto office has been
characterized as a political solecism, without foundation in reason
and without support in law, and therefore a person cannot be a
de facto officer of a municipal corporation when the corporation or
people have in law no power, in any event, to elect or appoint such
an officer."
Whether there can be a de facto office-a defacto court-is the
important question in the case, and it is one of no small difficulty.
While there have been many cases in which it was attempted to
call in question, in a collateral proceeding, the legal right of an
officer to hold an office, there have been few where the legal existence of the office itself was contested. The reason given for the
de facto doctrine applies as well to offices and courts as to officers.
Said the court in State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 467, "the de facto
doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and
necessity, to protect the interests of the public and of individuals
whose interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers." It
would be a matter of almost intolerable inconvenience, and be productive of many injustices, of individual hardship and injustice,
if third persons, whose interests or necessities require them to rely
upon the acts of the occupants of public offices, should be required
to ascertain at their peril the legal right to the offices which such
occupants are permitted by the state to occupy. Taking even the
narrowest definition of an officer de facto, viz., that he is one who
is exercising the duties of an office under color of legal right to
the office, the reasons that justify the doctrine apply with equal
force to a court or office where the same may be said to exist
under color of right ;'.that is, under color of law. That there may
be a de facto municipal corporation, and consequently de facto
officers of the same, follows from the rule laid down in Cooley
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Const. Lim., § 254. "If a municipal corporation appears to be
acting under color of law and recognised by the state as such, such
a question (that is of the legal existence of the corporation) should
be raised by the state itself by quo warranto, or other direct proceeding." And it is sustained by many anthorities, holding that
the question cannot be raised collaterally : State v. Carr, 5 N. H.
867 ; People v. ffa!ynard, 15 Mich. 463; Stuart v. School Dist.,
30 Id. 69; Bird v. Perkins, 33 Id. 28; President, &c., v.Thompson, 20 II1. 197; .Kittering v. Jacksonville, 50 Id. 39; Geneva
v. Cole, 61 Id. 897; Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; Stqte v.
Weatherby, 45 Id. 17; St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Id. 247; 1 Dill.
Mun. Cor., § 43.
In Secombe v. Kittelson, 25 Minn. 555, the court held, in effect,
that there might be a de facto state government.
In the line of these authorities are the only two cases we have
found in which an attempt was made to contest collaterally the
legal existence of a court: Fraser v. Freelon, 53 Cal. 634, was
a certiorarito review the proceedings of the Municipal Court of
Appeals of San Francisco in a private action. An -attempt was
made to draw in question the legality of that court. The Supreme
Court after referring to the rule in case of a de facto officer, said:
"It is manifest that the question whether the office which was
attempted to be created by statute has a legal existence is of
vastly more importance and of greater interest to the public than
the question of the right of the incumbent," and held that the
question could not be raised except in an action or proceeding by
the state. State v. Rich, 20 Mo. 893, was an appeal from a judgment of the Lawrence county circuit court, quashing an indictment
found in, and removed into it from, the Stone county circuit court,
on the ground that the latter county had not been constitutionally
established, and consequently there could be, in point of law, no
such court as the Stone county circuit court, where an indictment
could lawfully be found. The Supreme Court held that, "all such
inquiries must be excluded whenever they come up collaterally, and
the county, its courts and officers, must be treated as existing in
fact, the lawfulness of which cannot be questioned, unless in a
In view of these authodirect proceeding for that purpose."
rities and of the reason that underlies the rule applied to acts
of persons in the actual exercise, under certain circumstances,
of the duties of public officers, and of the great public mischiefs
VOL. XXXII.-68
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that might sometimes arise but for the application of the rule to
courts, we-arrive at the conclusion that there may be de facto courts
or offices, the legality of whose existence cannot be questioned,
except in a direct proceeding by the state for that'purpose.
We need not in this case attempt a definition to cover all instances of a court or officer de facto. It is enough to determine upon
the particular facts of this case. But we may go so far as to lay
down the proposition, that where a court or office has been established by an act of the legislature apparently valid, and the court
has gone into operation, or the office is filled and exercised under
such act, it is to be regarded as a de facto court or office. In other
words, that people shall not be made to suffer because misled by
the apparent legality of such public institutions. It remains only
to apply the principle to the case in hand. In Sup'rs v. Heenan,
2 Minn. 330, it being alleged that a certain law had not passed
the two houses in the manner prescribed by the constitution, the
court decided that it was to be tried by the court and not by a jury,
and that it might inspect the original bills on file with the sbcretary of stat6, and have recourse to the journals of the legislature
to ascertain whether or not the law had received all the constitutional sanctions, to its validity. And in State v. .astings, 24 Minn.
78, upon a similar question, it was decided that the effect of signing the enrolled bill by the presiding officers of the two houses,
as required by the constitution, is-to authenticate the bill, and that
being authenticated it is presumed to have passed in accordance
with the requirements of the constitution; that under the rule in
Sup'rs v. ieenan, supra, the presumption is not conclusive, but
may be overthrown by a reference to the journals. There could
be no such presumption, and no necessity of reference to the journals to overthrow it, if courts took judicial notice of the contents
of the journals or of the course of bills in the two houses. The
act in question having been authenticated in the proper manner and
approved by the governor, and the subject of it being within the
constitutional power of the legislature, was, under the presumption
stated in State v. Hastings, supra, prima facie a valid law, and
the court it attempted to create, primafacie a legal court. It was
therefore, within the principle we have stated, a court de facto.
Application denied.
MITCH-ELL, J., dissenting.-Iconcur in the conclusion that under
the facts of this case the legal existence of the municipal court of
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Mankato cannot be attacked collaterally in this action, but only by
direct proceeding for that purpose, and this, as I understand it,
is, strictly speaking, the only matter properly before us at this time.
But I am unable to concur in the views expressed in the majority
opinion, that even if the act creating the court was never constitutionally passed, still it was a de facto court. The logical result of
this would be that the person assuming to act as judge of that
court would be an officer de facto and the judgments of the court
as-valid as those of a legal court. To borrow an expression from
the majority opinion, I think that a de facto court or office is a
political solecism. The idea of an officer de facto presupposes the.
existence of a legal office. It seems to me that there cannot be an
officer de facto finless there is a legal office, so that there might be
an officer de jure. There are many cases to the effect that a per-son holding an office under an unconstitutional law is an officer de
facto, but I think that in every one it will be found that there was
a legal office and that the law only went to the mode or manner of
filling it. As suggested in the opinion, the de facto doctrine is
founded on reasons of public policy and necessity, but it must have
some reasonable limit, unless we are ready to recognise practical
revolution and legislative right to ignore all constitutional barriers.
As bearing on the views here suggested, see Dill. Mun. Corp., § 276,
Cooley Const. Lim. 750, 751, and note; Carleton v. People, 10
Mich. 250; In re Boyle, 9 Wis. 264; Ex parte Strang, 21 Ohio
St. 610 ; Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa 15 ; Hildreth's Heirs v.
MXcntire's Devisee, 1 J. J. Marsh. 207.
BERRY, J.-I

concur with my brother

GENERAL uLE.-NO principle is better settled than that the acts of an officer
de facto are valid when they concern the
public or third persons who have an interest in the thing done: Knight v. Corporation f VdIls, Lutw. 508; Knowles
v. Luce, Moore 109 ; O'Brian v. Enivan, Cro. Jac. 552 ; Parker v. Kett, I
Ld. Raym. 658 ; Rex v. Bedford Level,
6 East 356; Fowler v. Beebe, 9 Mass.
231 ; State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 ;
People v. Collins, 7 Johns. 549; 31cInstry v. Tanner, 9 Id. 135; Wilcox
v. Smith, 5 Wend. 231 ; People v. Bartlett, 6 Id. 422 ; People v. White, 24 Id.
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525; People v. Covert, I Hill 674;
Bucknam v. Ruggles, 15 Mass. ISO;
Baird v. Bank of WTashington, I1 S. &
R. 411 ; Cocke v. Halsey, 16 Pet. 85;
Trustees v. Hills, 6 Cow. 23; Parker v
Boardof Sup'rs, 4 Minn. 59 ; Brown v.
Lunt, 37 Me. 423; State v. Brown, 12
Minn. 538; Ictormick v. Ft4h, 14 Id.
252; Com'rs v. Brisblin, 17 Id. 451;
People v. Peabody, 6 Abb. Pr. 228; Peoplev. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; Town of Rtymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 585 ; In re
Boyle, 9 Wis. 264; Board of Auditors
v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176; Riddle v.
County of Buford, 7 S. & R. 386 ; Peo-
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pie v. Nostrand,46 N. Y. 375; Sarage v.
Ball, 2 C. E. Green 143 ; Belfast v. MAorrill, 65 Me. 580; People v.- Staton, 73
N. C. 546; Rice v. Commonwealth, 3
Bush 14.

McGregorv. Balch, 14 Vt. 428 ; a clerk
re-elected but who has failed to give bond
or take the oath: Douglas v. Neil, 7
Heisk. 438: one appointed by the governor but not confirmed by the senate :
Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 ; one holdExcEpio.s.-Acts of de facto offiing under apparent authority of a statcers are not valid when pleaded for the
ute which is afterwards declared uncorbenefit of the officer himself: Patterson
stitutional: Commonwealth v. McCombs,
v. Miller, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 493; Venable
56 Penn. St. 436 ; aldermen acting as
v. Curd, 2 Head 582 ; Gourley v. Hanjudges of the criminal court under a stat45
v.
Alcorn,
Kimball
75
;
kins, 2 Clark
afterwards declared void : People v.
ute
Miss. 151 ; Green v. Burke, 23 Wend.
24 Wend. 520; officers failing
White,
as
not
apply
does
doctrine
The
490.
oath of office : People v. Colthe
to
take
against the people in an action to try
7 Johns. 549; in re Kendall, 85
the title to the office; People v. Albany, lins,
Y. 302 ; a constable who at the time
4-c., Railroad, 55 Barb. 344. Nor as N.
against an officer dejure upon a question of making the levy was a minor: Green
Wend. 490.
as to the emoluments of the office : Mc- v. Burke, 23
Cue v. Wapello, 56 Ia. 698. Nor as to
EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABovz.-An althe acts ofa mere usurper, without color derman elected a representative to Conof title: Hooper v. Goodwin, 48 Me. 79;
gress, and accepting the latter office, is
Vaccari v. Maxwell, 3 Blatch. 368.
no longer alderman de jure or de facto:
INCIDENTS OF THE nuLs.-Their acts People v. Common Council, 77 N. Y. 503.
cannot be questioned collaterally: Com- Where an act of the legislature gave a
missioners v. Brisbin, 17 Minn. 451 ; city anew charter, which was adopted,
Aulanier v. Governo, I Tex. 653 ; and the offices under the old charter were desee most of the authorities first cited. termined, by the act of adoption, and
They must be in actual possession of the their incumbents were no longer officers
'office, M Cahon v. Commissioners, 8-Kans. de jure or de facto: Long v. The Mayor,
437 ; Petersiliav. Stone, 119 Mass. 465. 81 N. Y. 425.
They cannot be compelled to act, and
It has been held that there may be an
will incur no liability by a mere omis- officer difacto without appointment or
sion to act: Olrsted v. Dennis, 77 election: McLean v. State, 8 Heisk. 22.
N.Y. 378 ; Bentley v. Phelps, 27 Barb. But there must have been an acquies524.
cence by the public in the acts of the
PARTICULAR INSTANCES WHERE PER- person holding: Kimball v. Alcorn, 45
SONS HELD OFFICES DE FAOTO.-One Miss. 151.
The rule that there can be no officer
appointed by the governor when the governor had no authority to appoint, Par- de facto where there is no office de jure,
ker v. Baker, 8 Paige 428 ; a justice ap- where the law itself negatives the 'idea
pointed by selectmen having no power that there can be a legal incumbent, is
to appoint: Mallett v. Uncle Sam Co., 1 recognised in some of the states: CarleNev. 188 ; a clerk appointed to the city ton v. The People, 10 Mich. 250; Ex
council by the vote of an alderman de parte Strang, 21 Ohio St. 610.
General reputation that they are -offifacto: Peoplev. Stevens, 5 Hill 616 ; a
justice holding over after the expiration cers, with proof that they acted as such,
of his term: Wilcox v. Smith, 5 Wend. is sufficient to show that the persons are
officers de facto: Rung v. Grant, 7
231 ; it justice who was also postmaster:
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Wend. 341; McCoy v. Curtice, 9 Id.
17.
The first recorded mention of the doctrine is found in the case of T7ie Abbe of
Fontaine, tried in 1431, and found in the
Year Books. The abbacy being vacant
an election was held at which R. had
twenty-four votes and F. but eight votes.
F., notwithstanding, procured himself to
be inducted into the office by tlLe
visiting
ordinary, and took possession of the
convent, and while so wrongfully holding
possession, executed the bond in suit.
The contention was as to his authority to
execute the bond. The report does not
state the decision of the court, but the
question whether F. was not an officer
de facto and his acts valid was freely dis-cussed by the judges, and the conclusion
seems to be that his act in executing the
bond was legal.
Knowles v. Luce, Moore 109, frequently cited, was where two stewards
were authorized to hold a manorial court
jointly, and one held court alone and
took a surrender. It was held that he
had sufficient color of title to constitute
him an officer defacto, and the surrender
was sustained.
In, O'Brianv. Knivan, Cro. Jac. 552,
a new bishop, put in possession before the
old one was legally removed, was held a
good officer de facto as to third persons.
In Lord Dacre's Case, I Leonard 288,
where a servant of the steward held manorial court without authority, his acts
were held valid as those of a de facto
officer. So the deputy of a deputy was
held a good officer de facto, although the
deputy had no power to appoint: Leak
v. Howed, Cro. Eliz. 533.
Parker v. Kett, I Ld. Raym. 658, is
a case frequently referred upon this question. In this case Lord HOLT defined
an officer de facto to be, "no other than
he who has the reputation of being such
steward, and yet lie is not a good steward in point of law." This case was followed by Rex v. Bedford Level, 6 East
356, in which Knowles v. Luce, supra,

was noticed and relied upon. This
was a case where a deputy recording
officer continued to act after the death of
his principal, and he was held an officer
de facto. Lord ELLEI noOUG, following the definition in Parkerv. Kett, considered an officer de facto to be, "one
who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a
good officer in point of law," but he
further observed that such "reputation"
must necessarily have ceased with the
knowledge of the death of his principal.
The decision proceeds upon the theory
that the steward after the death of his
principal was acting colore offlcii, and
upon this point his lordship says, "this
must be understood of acts of the understeward after the death of his principal,
and before his death is known; for if
that were known to the tenants, what
color could he have to act ?" And he
adds, that this doctrine (Moore 112)
seems no more than what was the law
in the case of all judicial offices when the
interest of the officers determined on the
demise of the crown; for though in consideration of law the commissions of the
judges immediately determined on such
demise, yet their intermediate acts, between the demise of the crown and notice
of it, were good, citing 2 Hale's P. C.
24, Cro. Car. 97.
Of the earlier American cases, that of
Fowler v. Bebee, 9 Mass. 231, is frequently cited and may be regarded as s
leading case on this subject. This case
sustains the acts of an officer appointed
by the governor, and exercising the functions of the office some months before the
law creating the office and authorizing
the appointment came into force.
In State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, the
question arose as to the acts of one appointed by and acting pursuant to an
unconstitutional law, performed before
the unconstitutionality of the law had
been judicially determined, and it was
there held that his acts were valid as the
acts of an officer de facto. The court,
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BUTIER, C. J., reviews the authorities

fully and gives this definition of what
constitutes an officer de facto. ".An
officer de facto is one whose acts, though
not those of a lawful officer, the law,
upon principles of policy and justice,
will hold valid so far as they involve the
interests of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were
exercised.
"First, without a known appointment
or election, but under such circumstances
of reputation or acquiescence as were
calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action,
supposing him to be the officer he assumed
to be.
"Second, under color of a known and
valid appointment or election, but where
the officer had failed to conform to some
precedent requirement or condition, as
to take an oath, give a bond or the
like.
"Third, under color of a known election or appointment, void because the
officer was not eligible, or because there
was a want of power in the electing~or
appointing bodyj or by reason of some
defect or irregularity in its exercise, such
ineligibility, wafit of power, or defect
being unknown to the public.
"Fourth, under color of an election
or appointment by or pursuant to an unconstitutional law, before the same is
adjudged to be such."
In People v. Wiite, 24 Wend. 520, the
prisoner was indicted, tried and convicted
in the courts of general sessions and oyer
and terminer in the city of New York,
and it was, among other things, objected, against the validity of the judgment, that the aldermen of the citycould
not rightfully sit in those courts, that
the acts of the legislature conferring this
authority were repugnant to the constitution, and therefore void. The court,
BRONsoN, J., upon this point, held that
they were at least judges de fact; with
color of legal title, and that their acts
were valid and could not be questioned

collaterally, and the judgment was affirmed. Upon the case being removed
into the court for the correction of errors,
the chancellor held that "the principle,
that the official acts of officers de facto
are valid as between third persons, cannot properly be applied to an unconstitutional exercise. of power by an officer
de jure who claims to exercise that power
by virtue of such office :" Id. p. 539.
Senator EnwAnws was of opinion that
the acts of the court as a court de facto
could not be sustained : Id. 550. Senator FuxzEAN, although of opinion that
the court as constituted was not organized
according to the statute, held that the
constitutional objection could not be
raised in this collateral proceeding. With
him agreed Senator RooT: Id. 560.
Senator VEnPLANcK was of opinion that
they were judges de facto, and their acts
could not be questioned in this proceeding: Id. 563, 567. The case was reversed, but upon other grounds stated in
the opinion.
The case of Hildreth's Heirs v. Mcntire's Devisees, I J. J. Marsh. 206,
more nearly approaches the principal case
in its peculiar features than any other.
There, under some legislative sanction,
a court of appeals had been established,
and it was held to be unconstitutional,
in a collateral proceeding respecting the
rights of third persons. The court,
ROBERTSON, J., say, "A de facto court
of appeals cannot exist under a written
constitution which ordains our Supreme
Court, and defines the qualifications and
duties of its judges and prescribes the
mode of their appointment. *** Without a total revolution there can be no
such political solecism in Kentucky as a
defacto court of appeals," and the court
holds the acts of the judges of such court
void.
The precise question presented in the
principal case, it is believed, has not before been considered by a court of last
resort, although questions of the constitutionality of the law under which per-

